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PRELIMINARY DRAFT – November 5, 2013
Not for quotation or attribution without the authors’ consent

WAITING FOR PERSEUS: A SUR-REPLY TO PROFESSORS GRAETZ AND WARREN

Ruth Mason and Michael S. Knoll
University of Virginia and University of Pennsylvania

Introduction
In an article published last year, entitled What is Tax Discrimination?, we offered two main
arguments.1 First, we argued that tax discrimination, prohibited by European Union law, is not
(as other scholars have argued) an incoherent concept, but can be best interpreted and understood
as requiring what we call “competitive neutrality.” Competitive neutrality, which is akin to the
colloquial notion of ensuring a level playing field, prevents states from using their tax laws so as
to put non-residents at a tax-induced competitive advantage relative to residents in the
competition to secure jobs and make investments.

In our view, not only is the Court’s

competitive neutrality interpretation of tax discrimination not incoherent, but it is a reasonable
interpretation of the applicable law. Second, we argued contrary to common perceptions about
what tax nondiscrimination requires, if the Court interprets the EU tax nondiscrimination
principle to prohibit violations of competitive neutrality, then the nondiscrimination principle
does not require identical taxation of residents and non-residents by any member state. This is
important because national policymakers and commentators have criticized the Court for
imposing what they see as an impossible standard of identical taxation of residents and
nonresidents. Instead, we showed that competitive neutrality requires only what we called
“uniform” taxation. Specifically, states must apply the same source taxes to residents and nonresidents working within their jurisdiction, and states must apply the same residence taxes to
their residents’ domestic and foreign-sourced income. The cumulative effect of source and
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residence taxes may result in residents and nonresidents paying tax at different rates, but, as we
showed in our article, those differences will not violate competitive neutrality. Competitive
neutrality, thus, is not the same as tax harmonization or equal taxation because, when states tax
on both a residence and source basis, residents of different states will face different total tax rates
when they compete in a given market, but their competition will not be distorted by taxation.
Accordingly, we argued that the ECJ should strike down non-uniform tax laws as discriminatory,
and it should uphold uniform laws as non-discriminatory. We argued that such guidance is
straightforward and allows courts to promote a level playing field using commonsense rules of
thumbs and without the need to engage in sophisticated economic analysis or examine reams of
data.

In their response, Michael Graetz and Alvin Warren, took issue directly with the two main
theses of our article and much else we wrote there. 2 We are grateful for the deep engagement by
Professors Graetz and Warren with our article. A reader of those two articles might think there is
nothing involving tax discrimination with which we and they agree. That is not true. Let us
begin by highlighting twelve important areas where we agree with Graetz and Warren.
First, we agree with Graetz and Warren that the ECJ tax discrimination cases are important.3
They are important in part because of the amounts of money involved.4 Those cases are also
important because they arise from two powerful forces that are in opposition to one another.5 On
the one side are the long-established, closely guarded interests of each member state in
designing, enforcing, and operating their own tax systems. On the other side are the interests of
the European Union and all of its member states in ensuring that individual member states do not
take actions that compromise the single market. As Graetz and Warren appropriately put it,
“[t]here is considerable tension inherent in this structure.”6 Second, we agree that the EU treaties
2

Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Income Tax Discrimination: Still Stuck in the Labyrinth of
Impossibility, 121 Yale L.J. 1118 (2012).
3
See Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1121-22.
4
Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Dividend Taxation in Europe: When the ECJ Makes Tax Policy,
Common Market L. Rev. 1577, _ (2007).
5
See Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Income Tax Discrimination and the Political and Economic
Integration of Europe, 115 Yale L.J. 1186, 1186 (2006) (“an irresistible force is now confronting an immovable
object”). See also Suzanne Kingston, The Boundaries of Sovereignty: The ECJ’s Controversial Role Applying
Internal Market Law to Direct Tax Measures, 9 Cambridge Y.B. Eur. Legal Stud. 287 (2006-07)
6
Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1121.
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were intended, among other goals, to create a single market that was relatively free of internal
barriers and where member states would not be able to favor their own residents over out-of-state
residents or to favor domestic over interstate economic activity and trade.7 As Graetz and
Warren write, ‘[m]ore recent analyses suggest a growing awareness that the rights and
obligations [contained in the EU treaties] constitute a general prohibition of discrimination
against commerce among the member states.’ In the language of a recent advocate general’s
opinion, national laws ‘must not result in less favourable treatment being accorded to
transnational situations than to purely national situations.’”8 Quoting the same opinion by
Advocate General Miguel Maduro, Graetz and Warren write that “the different criteria
established by the ECJ for the application of the Treaty freedoms, such as market access and
nondiscrimination based on nationality, ‘all spring from the same source of inspiration which [is]
. . . to prevent Member States from creating or maintaining in force measures promoting internal
trade to the detriment of intra-community trade.’”9

Third, we agree that the EU treaties promote the single market through both negative and
positive integration.10 Negative integration refers to limitations enforced by courts on member
state actions that interfere with the operation of the single market.

In contrast, positive

integration, which is brought about through legislative action, is the enactment of rules, laws, or
directives that apply uniformly throughout the single market. Commentators often refer to
positive integration as harmonization. The European Commission, Council, and Parliament
together can issue income tax directives that apply uniformly throughout the European Union,
but such tax directives are rare because they require unanimous agreement by the member
states.11 Positive integration is more common in the European Union in areas outside of taxation
where unanimity is not required. Fourth, we agree that the norm against tax discrimination is not
a stand-alone, explicitly articulated concept, but is instead derived from the fundamental
freedoms of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU):12 the free movement
7

Graetz & Warren (2006), 115 Yale L.J. at 1120-21.
Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1199 (footnotes omitted).
9
Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1199 (citing C-446/03, Marks & Spencer plc v. Haley, ¶ 37 (Apr. 7,
2005) (opinion of advocate general Maduro).
10
See Graetz & Warren (2006), 115 Yale L.J. at 1120.
11
See Graetz & Warren (2006), 115 Yale L.J. at 1120.
12
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Mar. 30, 2010 [hereinafter
TFEU].
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of goods, capital, workers, services and the right of business establishment.13

Thus, the

fundamental freedoms, expressed as individual rights, also operate as limitations on the policies
of the member states,14 and so constitute a form of negative integration.

Fifth, we also agree with Graetz and Warren that the prohibition against tax discrimination is
the principal legal construct that the ECJ has used to strike down tax laws that interfere with the
single market.15 However, we recognize, as do Graetz and Warren, that the ECJ also has used
other constructs—for example, the notion of “restrictions”–—to strike down laws that interfere
with the single market, including some tax laws.16 Sixth, we agree that any interpretation of
discrimination in the tax context should be capable of being extended more broadly to non-tax
cases covered by the fundamental freedoms, or at least it should be capable of co-existing with a
reasonable interpretation of those non-tax cases.17 Seventh, we agree that the capital and labor
tax discrimination cases should be treated similarly.18 That is to say, we agree that any theory of
tax discrimination should apply to both labor and capital, and it should not apply to only one
sphere but not the other.19

Eighth, we agree that the ECJ tax discrimination cases are confusing and that the ECJ has not
clearly and consistently articulated its guiding principle for deciding them. There are numerous
reasons for this failure.

Professors Rita de la Feria and Clemens Fuest emphasize the

“archetypal” confusion between method and objective.20 In their view, the ECJ treats preventing

13

Graetz & Warren (2006), 115 Yale L.J. at 1194 (describing nondiscrimination as “a concept developed
principally through the ECJ’s interpretation of the four freedoms”).
14
See Graetz & Warren (2006), 115 Yale L.J. at 1120 (describing the ECJ’s charge to ensure that tax laws do
not interfere “unduly” with the fundamental freedoms).
15
Graetz & Warren (2006), 115 Yale L.J. at 1121.
16
A full discussion of how our approach would apply to restrictions is also beyond the scope of this sur-reply.
17
Graetz & Warren (2006), 121 Yale L. J. at 1152.
18
As we explained in our earlier Article, the reason we focused on the labor cases was to reach a broader
audience that would not likely be as interested in or might find it difficult to follow the technical tax issues raised in
the ECJ’s corporate tax cases. Mason & Knoll (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1038 (“although our arguments have
implications for capital taxation, we do not consider those implications here”).
19
That is to say, we accept what Graetz and Warren describe as the strong form of our claim. Graetz & Warren
(2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1128-29. Although we accept the strong form of the claim, we recognize that a thorough
discussion of how our approach would apply to capital, especially to investments made through corporations, is
beyond the scope of this sur-reply. The extension of our approach to capital is a matter we intend to take up in the
future.
20
Rita de la Feria & Clemens Fuest, Closer to an Internal Market? The Economic Effects of EU Tax
Jurisprudence, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation working paper 18 (July 2011).
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tax discrimination as an end in itself rather than as a means to an end, promoting free movement.
In our article, we mentioned the practice of issuing court opinions, rather than individual judges’
opinions, which tends to strip out the reasoning upon which the holding is based. Whatever the
reason, we agree with Graetz and Warren that the opinions of the ECJ are often written in an
opaque and bureaucratic manner that can obscure the rationale for their holdings.21 Such a lack
of clarity has attracted the condemnation of commentators.

As we wrote in our article,

commentators have described the ECJ’s tax discrimination jurisprudence as “baffling,”
“theoretical and arcane,” and “incoherent.”22 Our article begins with those criticisms and seeks
to provide an avenue to allay them by identifying the efficiency principle, if any, behind the
ECJ’s interpretation of tax discrimination, by explaining that principle in economic terms, and by
describing how to consistently apply that principle.

Ninth, we agree with the conclusion of Graetz and Warren, which they set forth most
extensively in their 2006 Yale Law Journal article, that the ECJ’s tax jurisprudence cannot be
readily reconciled with either capital import neutrality (CIN) or capital export neutrality (CEN).
Tenth, we agree that there is no single principle that any of the four of us has articulated that will
explain either the reasoning or the result of 100 percent of the ECJ tax discrimination cases.
Eleventh, we agree with Graetz and Warren that the ECJ has been more aggressive in striking
down member state laws that advantage residents over foreigners than in striking down laws that
advantage foreigners over residents.23 That is to say, the ECJ has rarely found instances of
“reverse discrimination” to violate the prohibition on tax discrimination.24 Twelfth, we agree
with Graetz and Warren that there are similarities between the tax discrimination jurisprudence
and constitutional structure of both the European Union and the United States.25 In our writings,
we and they have compared and contrasted the treatment of particular tax issues under the tax
nondiscrimination principles operating in each jurisdiction.26 Nonetheless, because Graetz and

21

Graetz & Warren (2007), 44 Com. Mkt. L. Rev. at 1602-11 (criticizing ECJ opinions for not explaining its
decisions).
22
Mason & Knoll (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1017 (quoting commentators).
23
Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1156-58.
24
Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1156.
25
Graetz & Warren (2006), 115 Yale L.J. at 1236-1244 (comparing U.S. and EU tax discrimination cases, but
emphasizing the differences between U.S. and EU legal structures that make drawing inferences from one context to
the other risky).
26
Graetz & Warren (2006), 115 Yale L.J. at 1236-1244; Mason & Knoll (2012), 121 Yale L. J. at 1106-1115.
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Warren confine themselves largely to the European Union in their response, we will try to do the
same here. These are significant areas of agreement, but perhaps more interesting are the places
where we disagree.

Much of the disagreement between us and Graetz and Warren appears to stem from a
difference in perspective. Graetz and Warren primarily take a national tax policy perspective.
They conclude that the ECJ’s decisions “did not (and could not) satisfy commonly accepted tax
policy norms, such as fairness, administrability, economic efficiency, production of desired level
of revenues, avoidance of double taxation, fiscal policy responses to economic circumstances,
inter-nation equity and so on.”27 They criticize the ECJ’s tax nondiscrimination jurisprudence
because it compromises each member state’s ability to enact good tax policy, that is, Graetz and
Warren examine the ECJ tax discrimination decisions from the perspective of how those
decisions encroach on member states’ tax sovereignty. But nowhere do they offer a clear
interpretation of the fundamental freedoms or a precise statement of the meaning of tax
discrimination. Nor do they offer a clear indication how the ECJ should enforce the fundamental
freedoms.28

We, in contrast, take as our starting point the notion that the tax nondiscrimination principle
prevents states from enacting tax laws that interfere with the operation of the single market—
including cases where notions of national tax policy might counsel otherwise.29 By examining
the language and structure of the foundational treaties, contemporaneous sources that explain the
goals and benefits of the treaties, and the ECJ tax discrimination cases, we then attempt to
describe in more detail what aspects of the single market the tax nondiscrimination principle is
intended to advance.30 Based on our reading of those sources, we conclude that the value
promoted by the fundamental freedoms is what we call “competitive neutrality”—the idea that
states should not use their tax and regulatory systems to discourage competition from out-of-state
interests. We translate that value into the language of modern public finance.
27

Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1118.
Graetz and Warren do provide the ECJ with a menu of options, which we consider later. See infra notes ___–
___ and accompanying text.
29
For example, there could be circumstances under which a particular state would gain from enacting a
protectionist tax, and a tax policy perspective that advocates maximizing national welfare therefore would counsel in
favor of the tax. Nevertheless, the tax nondiscrimination principle, as we understand it, would forbid such a tax.
30
Mason & Knoll (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1026-1033, 1085-1097.
28
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Specifically, we argue that the fundamental freedoms, as they have been interpreted by the
ECJ through its application of the tax nondiscrimination principle, should be understood as
promoting what public finance economists call capital ownership neutrality (CON) in cases
involving capital movement and business establishment and as the labor analog of CON in cases
involving the movement of workers and provision of services. Together, we refer to these
underlying values as competitive neutrality, or sometimes as a “level playing field.” We argue
that if the ECJ agrees, as its cases seem to indicate, that the tax nondiscrimination principle
promotes competitiveness, then the Court should say so explicitly.

That the tax nondiscrimination principle would pursue a level playing field between
economic actors from different EU member states is an intuitively attractive idea, but achieving a
level tax playing field often requires thinking in non-intuitive ways. For example, as we explain
in our article, whether competition between two actors is tax-neutral cannot be determined from
a simple comparison of their absolute tax rates. Because the formal requirements of competitive
neutrality are not obvious, we describe at length what a competitive neutrality interpretation of
tax nondiscrimination means for how states and courts should apply the tax nondiscrimination
principle to real cases.31

We argue (under standard, idealized economic assumptions) that

competitive neutrality requires what we describe as “uniform” source and residence taxation and
universal adoption of one of two methods of cross-border taxation. We also show that some
long-standing and widely accepted tax policies interfere with the single market. We go on to
consider various institutional constraints and limitations the ECJ faces that prevent it from fully
achieving the competitiveness goals underlying the fundamental freedoms. In light of those
constraints, we offer specific recommendations for how the ECJ can balance the goals of the
single market with the Court’s own limited powers and with other competing values.32

31

In further work, we intend to look more deeply into what is required in order to achieve CON. As part of that
exercise, we intend to expand our analysis to cover related questions, such as, how should a determination be made
whether residents and nonresidents are sufficiently similar for the purpose of making the relevant comparison for a
discrimination determination.
32
Additionally, and for good measure, in case the ECJ does not agree with our reading of its tax discrimination
decisions, we offer formal analysis of how the ECJ should decide tax cases if the nondiscrimination principle instead
requires locational neutrality or savings/leisure neutrality. Mason & Knoll (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1043-51, 72-74.
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I.

Interpreting the Tax Nondiscrimination Principle to Require Competitive Neutrality

While we cannot hope to answer all the objections Graetz and Warren raise in their fifty page
response to our article, we will try here to respond to what we view as their most serious
criticisms. Those criticisms can be divided into two broad categories that track the two parts of
our original article.

First, Graetz and Warren take issue with our interpretation of tax

nondiscrimination as concerned with competitiveness.

Second, Graetz and Warren raise

questions about how our proposal would apply in both theory and practice. We take these two
groups of criticisms in turn.

A. Methodological Criticism: The Role of Welfare Economics
In our article, we argued that the ECJ has been enforcing the TFEU’s prohibition on tax
discrimination in a manner that promotes competiveness. Graetz and Warren, however, claim to
be “mystified” by our theory of constitutional interpretation.33 According to them, we first
choose economic efficiency as the paramount norm for evaluating tax discrimination. We then
choose one efficiency concept, competitive neutrality, over other alternative efficiency concepts
without theoretical or empirical support. And then, after subsequently conceding that the ECJ
lacks institutional authority to fully implement competitive neutrality on its own (because it
needs assistance from the legislature), we then urge the ECJ to raise competitive neutrality to
“constitutional status.”34

In our view, the above description seriously misconstrues both the structure and the
substance of our argument.35 It essentially reverses our argument. We begin with the language
and structure of the treaties.36 The treaties establish the goal of the creation of an internal
market, “an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons,
services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of the Treaties.”37 The EU
treaties advance the vision of an internal market in at least two ways. First, they provide a
legislative process whereby member states can harmonize their laws (although this process is
33

Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1153.
Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1153.
35
Graetz and Warren offer a summary of what they believe our argument to be in eight propositions. Graetz &
Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1127-28. In our view, that summary seriously misstates our arguments.
36
Part III of our original article makes the case for a competitive neutrality interpretation of nondiscrimination.
37
TFEU, Art. 26, para. 2.
34
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stricter in tax than in some other areas). Second, they expressly restrain the actions of the
member states, including through the fundamental freedoms.

In the direct tax area, the

fundamental freedoms are enforced principally, although not exclusively, as a prohibition on
what the ECJ has labeled “discrimination.”

Because the internal market and the fundamental freedoms are legal concepts with economic
content,38 we analyze them in efficiency terms. We did not choose an efficiency perspective at
random. As we explain in our article, our focus on efficiency follows the approach of the ECJ,
which couches its tax discrimination decisions exclusively in efficiency terms, rather than in
terms of other values, such as promoting political unity or solidarity.39 Having used the structure
and language of the EU treaties and the ECJ’s own tax discrimination jurisprudence to identify
efficiency as the most important value promoted by the prohibition of tax discrimination, to
determine what particular kind of efficiency the nondiscrimination principle pursues, we turned
to capital neutrality benchmarks that have served as the basis for efficiency analysis of
international tax since the 1960s, namely locational neutrality (also called capital export
neutrality or CEN)40 and saving/leisure neutrality (also called capital import neutrality or CIN).41
So would many commentators. For example, Graetz and Warren considered these two capital
neutrality benchmarks as possible candidates for interpreting nondiscrimination in their 2006
article.42 We also considered CON or competitive neutrality, another leading capital neutrality
benchmark, and one that Graetz and Warren did not consider in their 2006 article. Based on our
reading of the TFEU and the tax discrimination cases, we then concluded that the tax
nondiscrimination principle “accords better”43 with competitive neutrality than it does with the
38

Frans Vanistendael, General Report on the Fundamental Freedoms and National Sovereignty in the European
Union, chapter V in EU Freedoms and Taxation (F. Vanistendael, ed. 2006), at 171.
39
Mason & Knoll (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1034-6.
40
The term we use to cover CEN and its labor analog.
41
Savings/leisure neutrality is the term we use to cover CIN and its labor analog. In contrast, competition
between in-state and out-of-state commercial interests falls under competitive neutrality.
42
See Graetz & Warren (2006), 115 Yale L.J. at 1195-98 (describing how states can use their income tax laws
to discriminate against foreign products, producers and production and relating discrimination against foreign
producers to CON and discrimination against foreign production to CEN).
43
See, e.g., Mason & Knoll (2012), 212 Yale L.J. at 1022. See also id. at 1042 (“competitive neutrality turns out
to be a better fit than locational neutrality or leisure neutrality for the nondiscrimination principle, given the text of
the TFEU, the goals of the EU, and the ECJ’s tax nondiscrimination doctrine”) (emphasis added); id. at 1097 (“we
argue that the ECJ’s interpretation of the principle of tax nondiscrimination hews more closely to competitive
neutrality than to locational neutrality (and that it does not coincide at all with leisure neutrality).”) (emphasis
added).
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other two traditional capital neutrality benchmarks, namely locational neutrality and
saving/leisure neutrality. Thus, we did not chose competitive neutrality because we concluded,
without the benefit of theoretical or empirical support, that competitive neutrality would better
promote overall economic welfare.44 Rather, we chose competitive neutrality because it is a
superior interpretation of the language of the treaties than the other two norms and because it
accords better with the ECJ’s actual decisions in tax cases than do the other two benchmarks.
Thus, whereas Graetz and Warren characterize competitive neutrality as our “assumed
constitutional norm,”45 we would characterize it as an “observed constitutional norm.”

Graetz and Warren’s reversal of the structure of our argument plays out again and again
throughout their reply. They repeatedly criticize us for failing to justify on normative grounds
our claim that the doctrine of tax nondiscrimination should be interpreted and applied so as to
advance competitiveness.46 For example, Graetz and Warren fault us for not showing that the
interpretation of tax nondiscrimination that we endorse—competitive neutrality—would “reduce
tax-induced distortions more than competing efficiency norms.”47 They correctly argue that “a
policy decision based on an economic efficiency standard should be grounded on evidence as to
the magnitude of the various distortions.”48 We agree, and we acknowledge this in our article.49
Again, because our goal was to determine whether any of the efficiency norms fit the extant tax
discrimination jurisprudence, we did not see it as our goal to show that the norm that was the
best fit was also the best possible norm.50

44

Graetz & Warren repeatedly describe us as “choosing” competitive neutrality. But our argument is that the
language of the TFEU and the tax decisions of the ECJ reflect a choice to interpret tax nondiscrimination to promote
competitive neutrality. Thus, any choice that was made in favor of competitive neutrality was not made by us, but
rather by the founders of the EU and the members of the ECJ.
45
Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1153.
46
Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1141, 1153.
47
Mason & Knoll (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1118.
48
Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1139.
49
Mason & Knoll (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1098. See also id. at 1086 where we state in the text that “we do not
advocate competitive neutrality from first principles,” by which we explain in note 195 that “we do not argue that a
competitive neutrality interpretation of nondiscrimination would do a better job of promoting economic welfare or
any specific notion of the good, justice, or fairness than other possible interpretations”).
50
As we said in our original article, our claim that the tax discrimination principle is intended to promote
competitive neutrality is not an argument that the European Union does not care about locational neutrality or that
the EU treaties do not promote locational neutrality in other ways. The provisions in the foundational treaties that
set out procedures for achieving positive harmonization are a clear example of the value the European Union places
on locational neutrality.
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Graetz and Warren’s critique of our article amounts to a lament that we did not take up the
question, “What ought to be the interpretation of tax discrimination from an economic welfare
perspective?” But our goal was to answer a more limited set of questions, namely, “what is the
extant legal definition of tax discrimination, and what are the economic implications of that
definition?”51 Thus, we are trying to describe in a more rigorous, economics-oriented fashion the
interpretation that we believe best captures the existing language of the treaties and its
interpretation by the ECJ. Ideally, the answers to Graetz and Warren’s question and the answers
to our questions would be related. But it’s not obvious that they are identical. Their criticism,
thus, confuses our interpretive project with their policy project.

Although we view the welfare consequences of alternative ways of structuring
nondiscrimination law as secondary to our descriptive project, Graetz and Warren see it as
central to their normative project. For example, Graetz and Warren express surprise that we do
not focus on rate differentials among the member states.52 Rate differentials (Ireland taxes
everyone, resident or nonresident, at 15% while Germany taxes everyone at 40%) may burden
(or restrict) cross-border commerce. In that sense, of course rate differentials impact work and
investment within the European Union. But the ECJ has clearly held that the nondiscrimination
principle does not restrain variation in national tax rates, as long as each member state applies its
rates even-handedly to all comers.53 Thus, even if Graetz and Warren are correct when they
assert that rate differentials may be the most distortive features of member state tax systems,54
uniformly applicable rate differentials nonetheless are not relevant to the legal question
addressed by our article.55 Again, Graetz and Warren want to take on a big issue, namely, how
51

In the same vein, we do not ask whether it might be possible to draft or construct a different and more
efficient framework for the single market with a different division of rights and responsibilities among the member
states than that which is already contained in the EU treaties.
52
Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1148.
53
See, e.g., Gilly paras. 46-53.
54
Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1149.
55
Compare Case C-336/96, Gilly v. Directeur des Services Fiscaux du Bas-Rhin, 1998 E.C.R. I-2793, ¶¶ 34, 48
(holding that a cross-border tax disadvantage caused by the resident state’s foreign tax credit limitation did not
violate EU law because the disadvantage was caused by neutrally-applied, but divergent, “scales of direct taxation”
and to require the resident state to “reduce its tax in respect of the remaining income . . . would . . . encroach on its
sovereignty in matters of direct taxation”)with Royal Bank of Scot., 1997 E.C.R. I-2651, ¶ 34 (holding that Greece
discriminated when it taxed domestic banks at 35%, but branches of foreign banks at 40%).
Although rate differentials are an important source of locational distortions, they are left out of a variety of
multistate agreements designed to promote cross-border commerce. For example, the GATT and GATS allow
national VAT rates to vary, but they forbid certain import duties and export subsidies. The requirements under those
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do we reduce economic distortions in Europe? Rate differentials would clearly be important for
this question. But we have a narrower goal. We are asking only “what is tax discrimination?”

Our approach, which was to argue that a competitive neutrality interpretation of the tax
nondiscrimination principle seems to best fit the text and doctrine, may, as Graetz and Warren
claim, put us in a “second- or third-best world.” We do not disagree, and we acknowledge so in
our article.56

We, however, fail to see the connection between this observation and our

argument.57

Moreover, although Graetz and Warren say that they disagree with our

interpretation, they do not dispute our conclusion that competitive neutrality is the best fit for the
text and doctrine by offering an alternative interpretation that they claim better fits the text and
doctrine.58 There may be some not-yet-identified norm that corresponds better with the language
and the structure of the treaties and the doctrine than does competitive neutrality. But we have
not been able to identify it, and Graetz and Warren suggest no alternative.

Despite not claiming (and not regarding it as essential for our doctrinal argument to claim)
that competitive neutrality is the best possible interpretation of tax nondiscrimination, we do
claim in our article that interpreting the tax nondiscrimination principle to require competitive
neutrality is welfare-enhancing as compared to a situation in which the ECJ did not police tax
treaties are for “national treatment” and “most favored nation treatment,” which can also be characterized as
nondiscrimination obligations. Thus, allowing each state to choose its tax rate is not necessarily incompatible with
the idea of prohibiting protectionism (and other forms of discrimination).
56
Mason & Knoll (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1099, n. 235.
57
As Ian Roxan put it, the Treaty “provisions on freedom of movement are concerned to ensure that freedom of
movement is unrestricted. They do not themselves require that the resulting movement be economically efficient.”
Ian Roxan, 63 Mod. L. Rev. 831, 845 (2000).
58
Graetz and Warren object that there are examples of cases that do not seem to pursue competitive neutrality.
We do not disagree. As we note in our article, if the application of tax nondiscrimination rules reflect “competitive
neutrality goals, they do not reflect rigorous application of our formal conception of competitive neutrality.” Mason
& Knoll (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1116 (emphasis added). We speculate that this lack of rigor may be attributable to
the complexities and subtleties of competitive neutrality, and so we attempt to provide simple rules of thumb that
would assist courts in applying the concept in the future.
Graetz and Warren also argue that if the tax nondiscrimination principle required competitive neutrality, then
the ECJ should also strike down cases of so-called “reverse discrimination,” that is, cases in which the member state
treats outsiders better than insiders. We agree that a strict competitive neutrality interpretation of nondiscrimination
would compel this conclusion. While reverse discrimination is an important piece of the puzzle, we did not have
space in our article (or in this response) to address it. We note here, however, that the ECJ handles cases of reverse
discrimination under the more specific language in Article 107 TFEU which prohibits reverse discrimination under
the rubric “state aids.” See Article 107 TFEU, providing, in relevant part, “Save as otherwise provided in the
Treaties, any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or
threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far
as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal market.”
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discrimination at all.

That is because tax-induced distortions of competition—especially

protectionists taxes—reduce welfare, so eliminating them should enhance welfare. As we state
in the article,
There is no consensus among economists . . . that competitive neutrality is more important
than locational neutrality from a welfare perspective. . . . However, economists generally
agree that violations of competitive neutrality reduce welfare.

Economists also widely

recognize that states, unless they are constrained, will enact trade barriers that tilt the playing
field in favor of domestic interests with attendant negative welfare consequences. In other
words, absent legal or other restraints, states will tend to violate competitive neutrality, which
will reduce welfare.”59

Graetz and Warren would appear to agree. As they wrote in their 2006 article:
“[Limiting] the ability of the ECJ to strike down member states’ income tax provisions…
would permit considerable mischief by the member states. As our review of the ECJ
cases has shown, some member state tax provisions are potentially quite protectionist,
and some have been adopted to serve precisely that purpose. The dilemma for the nations
of Europe is to find a way to retain their autonomy over tax matters without undermining
the internal market and, as a practical matter, severely restricting the four freedoms.”60

Moreover, we believe that identifying competitive neutrality as the principle underlying the
ECJ’s tax discrimination decisions and putting that principle into economic terms provides
guidance for courts seeking to enforce the fundamental freedoms by framing the central issue in
tax discrimination cases. If, as we argued in the article, the judges of the ECJ are trying to apply
a competitive neutrality interpretation of nondiscrimination by intuition, then express
identification of that value should enable the Court to (1) clarify whether competitive neutrality
is indeed its guiding principle and (2) reach more consistent results. If the ECJ agrees that the
nondiscrimination principle pursues competitive neutrality, then in resolving tax discrimination
cases it need not limit itself to drawing analogies from precedent. Rather it can attempt to
directly ascertain whether or not the challenged tax policy interferes with competitive neutrality.

59
60

Mason & Knoll (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1098.
Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1233.
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In addition, identifying the principle behind tax discrimination and putting that principle into
economic terms also allows commentators and other court observers to evaluate whether the ECJ
or a national court has correctly applied the norm in particular tax discrimination cases.

B. Substantive Criticism
Graetz and Warren’s principal criticism is that we have not provided sufficient normative
grounding for that claim that the prohibition of tax discrimination in the TFEU is best interpreted
as promoting competitive neutrality. For the reasons described above, their welfare-economicsbased criticism is not germane to our interpretive argument. In their reply, Graetz and Warren
also raise several narrower, substantive challenges to our interpretation. Specifically, Graetz and
Warren argue that: (1) our interpretation of tax discrimination is too narrow from a normative
perspective;61 (2) the capital neutrality benchmarks that are the bases for the labor neutrality
benchmarks that we discuss in the article (especially CON) do not translate from capital to
labor;62 (3) our focus on cross-border workers is misplaced63 and our argument in favor of a
competitive neutrality interpretation of the law is based on an unrealistic assumption—that
residence is fixed;64 (4) we ignore the law on impermissible “restrictions” that is inconsistent
with our interpretation;65 and (5) a competitive neutrality interpretation of tax discrimination is
not supported by the outcomes of the cases, the language of the cases, or the EU treaties from
which the principle of tax nondiscrimination is derived.66

We respond to each of these

arguments in turn.

1. “Narrow” Focus on Efficiency
Graetz and Warren fault our conclusion that efficiency is “the most important norm for
deciding tax discrimination cases” because, in their view, “this is much too restrictive a focus for
constitutional courts.”67 Yet, many constitutions contain provisions that promote efficiency, and

61

Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1129-30.
Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1130-35.
63
Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1134-35.
64
Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1135-39.
65
Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1124-27.
66
Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1155-61.
67
Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1129.
62
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the EU treaties are no exception.68 For example, the EU treaties prohibit the member states from
imposing customs duties and quantitative restrictions on imports and exports.69 Free trade in
goods, a concept endorsed by the EU treaties, is surely an efficiency concept. In addition, the
history of the European Union reflects a strong desire to improve economic efficiency,70
although that is not the only motivation for the Union’s creation, maintenance, and growth.

But most importantly, economic efficiency is the only factor the ECJ cites in making its tax
discrimination determinations. As we noted in our article, “[b]ecause our goal . . . is to try to get
a clearer understanding of what the tax nondiscrimination principle requires, it seems prudent to
discuss what the ECJ itself has identified as tax nondiscrimination’s most important underlying
value.”71 Although it might reflect a lack of imagination, we are at a loss for how to formalize
the ECJ’s conception of tax discrimination without considering the only value that the ECJ has
identified as relevant to the project.72 Nor do Graetz and Warren cite any cases that support the
notion that economic efficiency is not the lodestar for tax discrimination cases. Although they
note that the ECJ “recently [has] given more weight to member state defenses grounded in fiscal
and administrative concerns,”73 that observation is misplaced. As we note in our article, the
procedure followed by the ECJ is to first determine whether a member state has engaged in tax
discrimination, and only then to determine whether the discrimination can be justified (for
example, by the need to prevent fiscal evasion).74 Thus, the discrimination and justification
determinations are legally and analytically distinct. That the ECJ finds tax discrimination to be
68

Think, for example, of the patent and copyright clause of the U.S. Constitution. U.S. Const. Art I, sec. 8, cl. 8
(giving Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”). The wording of this
clause recites the standard efficiency justification for such grants, to encourage creation of new products by
rewarding effort.
69
TFEU Arts. 28.1, 34 and 35 (also banning other charges having equivalent effect).
70
Comite Intergouvernemental Cree Par La Conference De Messine, Rapport Des Chefs De De1egation Aux
Ministres Des Affaires Etrangres, Doc. MAE 120 f/56 (1956) [hereinafter the Spaak Report].
71
Mason & Knoll (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1036.
72
We do not find an approach that begins with a definition, such as defining tax discrimination as equal
taxation, to be helpful. Because the norm of tax nondiscrimination is derived from the free movement principles,
not the other way around, such an approach does not provide a conceptual underpinning for the free movement
principles.
73
Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1129 (citing commentators, but not cases). Cases that they do not
cite, but seem to be referring to, in which the ECJ took member states’ revenue concerns into consideration, did so
in the justification stage of the ruling, not the discrimination stage. Even the language they quote from Professor
Joachim Englisch reflects this when he says that “the ECJ has been particularly inclined to uphold discriminatory
tax provisions based on the rule of reason…”). Id. at 1129, n. 45 (emphasis added).
74
Mason & Knoll (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1036.
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justified in light of other, non-efficiency, values does not imply that the discrimination
determination itself is not informed by solely or primarily by efficiency.

Moreover, any claim that a criterion other than efficiency carries greater weight in tax
discrimination determinations simply cannot be supported by the decisions of the ECJ.75 Thus,
in adopting economic efficiency as “the most important norm” for tax discrimination, we take
our cue directly from the Court. If we were starting from scratch and were charged with
designing a single market and were asked, “Ought there to be a tax nondiscrimination principle,
and if so, what should it mean?” we might give more weight to non-efficiency goals. Indeed,
after showing in our article that the Court’s tax discrimination interpretations accord better with
competitive neutrality than with the other efficiency norms of locational neutrality or leisure
neutrality, we showed how a competitive neutrality interpretation of tax nondiscrimination would
promote other values, such as representation reinforcement, political unity, legal certainty, and so
on.76 So we agree with Graetz and Warren about the importance of those values. But, as our
goal was to figure out what the EU treaties require, we focused on efficiency because, among
other reasons, that’s what the ECJ does.

Perhaps Graetz and Warren’s statement that economic efficiency is too narrow a focus for
constitutional courts is meant to convey the idea that the fundamental freedoms are not only
about efficiency, but also advance other non-economic, social issues. We do not disagree.
Consequently, we have no objection in theory to courts articulating other values in parallel with
competitiveness, whether related to efficiency or not and whether derived from the same or
different treaty sources.77

But exploring the economic efficiency values that motivate the

75

Graetz and Warren state, “[n]or do we agree with Mason and Knoll that the ECJ has declared economic
efficiency to be the most important underlying value in resolving these tax cases.” Graetz & Warren (2012), 121
Yale L.J. at 1129. But they cite no cases in support of any alternative proposition.
76
Mason & Knoll (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1097-1106.
77
For example the Supreme Court interprets the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause to protect both
political as well as economic rights, such as the right to make a living. Our approach does not have anything to say
about the protection of noneconomic rights, but it certainly does not in any way suggest that the ECJ would be
wrong to derive political rights from the fundamental freedoms. Nor would we say that the Supreme Court is wrong
in interpreting the Privileges and Immunities Clause to protect non-economic rights of citizenship in addition to
economic rights.
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fundamental freedoms is not a wrongheaded project, even if the fundamental freedoms also
pursue other values.78

2. Translating Capital Neutrality Benchmarks into Labor Benchmarks
Graetz and Warren argue that the familiar capital neutrality benchmarks (especially CON)
cannot be adapted to analyze labor, and therefore it makes no sense to analyze tax discrimination
against cross-border workers in terms of such concepts.

As best we can discern, the phrase “capital ownership neutrality” (CON), was first used by
Michael Devereux in 1990 in an unpublished paper.79 It first appeared in print in a 1994 article
by Robert Green, which incidentally was about tax discrimination, albeit in the context of
bilateral tax treaties.80

The concept of ownership neutrality started to receive substantial

attention when it was advocated by Mihir Desai and James Hines in a series of articles published
beginning in 2003.81 In those articles, Desai and Hines presented a normative argument that the
failure of tax policymakers to advance CON has substantial negative welfare consequences.
They advocated refocusing the direction of international tax policy in order to achieve or come
closer to CON. The welfare argument that Desai and Hines make, especially claims about the
relative size of any welfare distortions, is complicated, and it has been vigorously debated.82

78

Another possible interpretation of their claim is that the reasons or justifications behind a provision, even one
that is closely associated with economic efficiency, might extend beyond economic efficiency. Graetz has argued
elsewhere that the justification for many policies and principles, including economic principles, such as capital
export neutrality, might not be economic efficiency, but fairness. Michael J. Graetz, Taxing International Income:
Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 TAX L. REV. 261, PAGE (2001). If
Graetz and Warren are arguing that there are reasons other than efficiency for adopting the fundamental freedoms,
we do not disagree.
79
Michael P. Devereux, Capital Export Neutrality, Capital Import Neutrality, Capital Ownership Neutrality and
All That (June 11, 1990) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the authors).
80
See Robert A. Green, The Troubled Rule of Nondiscrimination in Taxing Foreign Direct Investment, 26 L. &
POL’Y INT’L BUS. 113, 138 (1994) (“[o]wnership neutrality prevails if the international tax system is neutral with
respect to the identity of the firm that owns and controls capital in a given country”). Professor Green’s employment
of this notion in the tax treaty nondiscrimination context shows that it is intuitive to conceive of legal prohibitions on
tax discrimination as seeking to prevent violations of competitive neutrality.
81
See, e.g., Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines Jr., Evaluating International Tax Reform, 56 NAT’L TAX J. 487,
494 (2003); Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines Jr., Old Rules and New Realities: Corporate Tax Policy in a Global
Setting, 57 NAT'L TAX J. 937 (2004); Mihir A. Desai, New Foundations for Taxing Multinational Corporations,
TAXES, Mar. 2004; James R. Hines Jr., Reconsidering the Taxation of Foreign Income, 62 TAX L. REV. 269 (2009).
82
See, e.g., Mitchell A. Kane, Ownership Neutrality, Ownership Distortions, and International Tax Welfare
Benchmarks, 26 VA. TAX REV. 53 (2006) (arguing that we lack empirical evidence that current methods of double
tax relief cause ownership distortions that are distinct from locational distortions); Mitchell A Kane, Considering
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Their formal economic argument includes a number of assumptions, such as the assumption that
capital is instantly mobile whereas labor is fixed, or at least that capital is much more mobile
than is labor. If the assumption of the relative immobility of labor as compared to capital is
important for the argument that there can be significant welfare gains from pursuing one or more
capital neutrality benchmarks, it might be difficult to make claims about the relative importance
of pursuing labor neutrality benchmarks. At the very least, as Graetz and Warren point out, if
one is going to make such normative claims, the argument needs to be constructed. Accordingly,
Graetz and Warren criticize us for employing the labor analog of CON and using it without
having laid the appropriate groundwork.83

Such an argument again confuses the scope of our doctrinal project with the normative
project that they would have preferred we undertake. We are not making a welfare economics
argument. We are not claiming that, if one were designing a tax system from the ground up,
achieving competitive neutrality for jobs would enhance welfare more than some other system.
Rather, our project is interpretive. Our reading of the cases and text led us to conclude that the
tax nondiscrimination principle requires a level playing field between out-of-state and in-state
providers of labor, capital, services, and business establishment.84 We use the language of
economics, namely CON and what we outline as the labor analog to CON, to give formal content
to the requirement of a level playing field. The controversial welfare arguments that Desai,
Hines, and others have made in the capital context advocating CON may not have the same force
in the labor context. But that doesn’t mean that the ECJ’s interpretation of tax nondiscrimination
is not animated by the desire to root out protectionism and promote competitiveness in both
capital and labor. Our argument is not that we (or the ECJ) conducted a careful study of welfare
economics and concluded that a competitive neutrality interpretation of tax discrimination would

“Reconsidering the Taxation of Foreign Income”, 62 TAX L. REV. 301 (2009) (comparing the methods of achieving
CON and arguing that global adoption of worldwide taxation would be better than global exemption); Stephen E.
Shay, Commentary Ownership Neutrality and Practical Complications, 62 TAX L. REV. 317 (2009) (arguing that
due to the flexibility of forms of ownership of assets, the link between taxation and ownership neutrality may be
weaker than suggested by advocates of CON); Harry Grubert & Rosanne Altshuler, Corporate Taxes in the World
Economy: Reforming the Taxation of Cross-Border Income, in FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM: ISSUES, CHOICES AND
IMPLICATIONS 319 (John W. Diamond & George R. Zodrow eds., 2008) (arguing that the welfare effects of each of
the neutrality benchmarks is presently indeterminate whereas theoretical discussions of such welfare effects rely on
very simple models).
83
Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1132-5.
84
Mason & Knoll (2012), 121 Yale L. J. at 1085-1106.
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be best for Europe. Rather, our argument is that, in interpreting the text of the treaties in light of
the goals of the EU, the ECJ regards competiveness as the principal value pursued by the concept
of tax nondiscrimination in all the areas covered by the fundamental freedoms. Because we used
the labor tax cases to illustrate our arguments, we expressed the value of “competitiveness” in
terms of what we described as a labor analog to CON. We used the CON concept because it is
familiar to our readers. We readily agree that we do not perform the groundwork to establish
competitive neutrality as a crucial normative goal for cross-border tax policy. That was not our
goal, and it was not necessary for our project. All we needed to do for our project was to
translate the economic idea of a level playing field into the labor context.85 The notion that taxes
can distort competition between workers is an intuitive and straightforward concept to
incorporate in the labor context.86

3. Focus on Cross-border Workers and Assumption of Fixed Residence
Graetz and Warren also take issue with our focus on cross-border workers and our
simplifying assumption that a worker’s residence is fixed.

Since our responses to those

criticisms are related, we consider them together. First, Graetz and Warren claim that by
narrowing our focus to the tax treatment of what we label “cross-border workers”—people who
commute across state borders for work or who earn labor income from more than one member
state in a single tax year—we neglect a more important issue, namely, workers who permanently
change their residence for tax reasons.87

The legal problem we chose to analyze—namely, “what is tax discrimination?”—dictated our
decision to focus (only) on cross-border workers. As we explained in our article, the legal
prohibition on tax discrimination generally does not apply to workers who permanently change
their state of residence in response to taxes.88 The reason for that is straight-forward. If a
taxpayer permanently moves to another state where she earns all her income, the new state will
tax her as a resident with purely domestic income. This is a case of domestic law applied to an
85

That is not to say that there are not subtleties in the application, which are often overlooked.
Indeed, the fact that CIN has long been and still is widely interpreted as focusing on competitiveness is
evidence of the intuitive appeal of competitiveness. See Michael S. Knoll, Reconsidering International Tax
Neutrality, 64 Tax. L. Rev. 99, 110-18 (2011).
87
Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1134-35.
88
Mason & Knoll (2012), 121 Yale L. J. at 1038-39.
86
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“insider” with no cross-border activities.

To illustrate, if, rather than commuting to

Luxembourg, a Belgian resident permanently moves to Luxembourg and earns all her income in
Luxembourg, Luxembourg will tax her like any other Luxembourger. This is an artifact of the
tax law; states generally use tax residence, rather than nationality, to determine how they will
exercise tax jurisdiction.

The Luxembourgish tax law therefore sees only residents and

nonresidents; it generally would not see old residents and new residents (or Luxembourg
nationals and everybody else). EU tax discrimination law says nothing about how Luxembourg
should tax its own residents’ exclusively domestic-source income. The legal concept of tax
discrimination simply does not apply to such “purely internal” situations.89 That’s not especially
surprising. We usually think of discrimination as adverse treatment of outsiders. It would be
surprising indeed if discrimination in the EU tax context were interpreted to cover a member
state’s treatment of its own resident’s purely domestic income.

To extend our example, should the new Luxembourg resident now decide to remain in
Luxembourg, but earn labor income from Germany so that there was a cross border element, EU
tax discrimination law would apply to her, and she would now fall into our category of “crossborder workers.” Our “cross-border worker” is just someone who has labor income from a state
other than (or in addition to) her residence state.90 By focusing explicitly on the kinds of
situations covered by the legal prohibition of tax discrimination, we do not mean to suggest that
residence distortions are unimportant as a policy or efficiency matter. We considered only the
set of taxpayers protected by the EU prohibition on tax discrimination because we were
interested in the meaning of that particular legal concept. Were we instead interested in the
normative project of eliminating the largest tax-induced economic distortions to work in Europe,
we might have taken a wider focus.91

89

According to Judge Koen Lenaerts, Vice President of the ECJ and Professor at the Catholic University of
Leuven, “[s]ince the ‘pervasiveness’ of EU law only applies to cross-border situations, purely internal situations are
not affected.” Koen Lenaerts, Federalism and the Rule of Law: Perspectives from the European Court of Justice, 33
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1338, 1341 (2010). See also Case C-112/91, Werner v. Finanzamt Aachen-Innenstadt, 1993
E.C.R. I-429, ¶¶ 16-17 (rejecting a taxpayer’s claim of tax discrimination because the facts presented a “purely
national” situation to which fundamental freedoms did not apply).
90
Residence, of course, is a legal status. Accordingly, one way to reduce residence distortions would be to
change the test used to determine residence.
91
We note that Graetz and Warren give no evidence of the importance or magnitude of workers changing their
state of residence. The only evidence they give in support of their claim that cross-border workers issues are
unimportant is to recognize that 25 percent of the tax discrimination cases, which equates to about 2 percent of all
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Relatedly, Graetz and Warren claim that our argument for a competitive neutrality
interpretation of tax discrimination is based on the “unrealistic” assumption that a taxpayer’s
residence is fixed.92 Graetz and Warren argue that this assumption is too restrictive if one is
trying to undertake a complete welfare analysis of the tax consequences of various rules or
interpretations.93 We do not disagree. We acknowledge that tax residence rules, such as the
dominant one in the European Union, whereby one becomes a resident of a new state after living
there for 6 months,94 will create distortions. Those distortions will interact with other distortions
complicating any welfare calculations.95 That is true, but irrelevant. Again, that argument
confuses our interpretive project with their welfare economics project.96 Our interpretation does
not depend upon any such assumption. Our simplifying assumption that workers cannot move is
used to illustrate how our approach works; it is not used to justify or support our argument for a
competitive neutrality interpretation of tax discrimination.97

Graetz and Warren also criticize us for ending up with a theory of sharply limited
applicability.98 They claim that our “entire analysis [is based on] the unrealistic assumption that
EU citizens will not take a job in another country if they have to live in the other country for
more than six months.”99

In addition, they claim our analysis is inapplicable to capital

investments where the assumption that residence is fixed “is patently implausible.”100 We
disagree with those claims.

ECJ cases, involve labor income. Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1137. We fail to see how this is
probative, especially since there are even fewer cases involving workers who change their state of tax residence.
92
Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1135-39.
93
Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1137-38.
94
Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1135.
95
There are numerous complex issues, such as the source of income, the question of what is a tax, the
determination of what expenditures or services should be treated as offsets to taxation, that interact with any tax
system and can complicated the administration of tax policy and the determination of what is the welfare
maximizing policy.
96
In several places, Graetz and Warren discuss how various tax rules can interact with one another and cause
jobs (or the demand for labor) to shift across locations.
97
Our response to Graetz and Warren’s claim that an assumption of fixed residence undercuts our policy
prescriptions are taken up later. See note _ - _ infra and accompanying text.
98
Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1139.
99
Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1135.
100
Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1136.
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Start with their claim that we assume EU nationals will not take a job in another country if
they have to live there for more than six months.101 What we actually say is that when an
individual has to change residence in order to take a new job, the doctrine of tax discrimination is
inapplicable because the taxpayer resides in the same state where he earns his income.102 EU
commentators refer to this as a “purely internal” situation, whereas the concept of tax
nondiscrimination only applies to cross-border activity.103 Thus, our decision to follow the lead
of the ECJ by excluding such movement from our analysis of tax discrimination was appropriate.
Moreover, although the ECJ has not applied the tax discrimination concept to the kinds of cases
that concern Graetz and Warren but that are not covered by our analysis (i.e., those in which an
EU national changes her residence and then earns purely domestic income in her new residence
state), the TFEU may nonetheless offer protection in those cases.104
101

Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1135 (“Mason and Knoll therefore base their entire analysis on an
assumption that EU citizens will not take a job in another country if they have to live in the other country for more
than six months”).
102
Mason & Knoll (2012), 121 YALE L. J. at 1038-9.
103
See references infra note ___.
104
Change-of-residence cases generally involve the extra-territorial assertion by the former residence state of
exit, inheritance, or pension taxes. Thus, they too involve a cross-border element, as they must to trigger the
application of the fundamental freedoms. But these cases have been decided under the rubric “restriction,” rather
than “discrimination.” See, e.g., Case C-9/02, De Lasteyrie du Saillant v. Ministère de l’Économie, des Finances et
de l’Industrie, 2004 E.C.R. I-2409, ¶ 45 (finding that the French exit tax “restricted” the freedom of establishment).
Restrictions were not the focus of our article. See infra Part I.B.4.
Although no such case has yet arisen in the ECJ, we can imagine tax discrimination (rather than restriction)
cases involving discrimination against new residents. When such cases have arisen in the United States, the
Supreme Court has analyzed them under the nondiscrimination principles embodied in the Privileges and
Immunities or Equal Protection Clauses. See, e.g., Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 12 (1992) (holding that
California’s Proposition 13A, which based property taxes on 1975–76 assessments did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause in spite of the law’s less favorable treatment of new residents because the rule was rationally
related to the state’s goal to encourage “neighborhood preservation, continuity, and stability”). Thus, while we do
not completely rule out the possibility that change-of-residence cases will be incorporated into the ECJ’s tax
discrimination doctrine, it seems to us prudent for now to focus on the kinds of cases that have actually arisen before
the Court. Moreover, if cases involving discrimination against new residents were to arise, they would fit
comfortably within our conceptual framework because the challenged laws in such cases would tilt the playing field
against external interests.
But, in our view, the change-of residence tax cases with a cross-border element (e.g., pension, exit, or
inheritance taxes) and hypotheticals in which member states discriminate against new residents do not represent
what’s really at stake for Graetz and Warren. They seem to want to know whether the TFEU aims to reduce tax
residence distortions, regardless of whether the taxpayer who changes residence continues to be involved in crossborder economic activities. We do not know enough to answer this question. While the ECJ has not interpreted the
tax nondiscrimination principle to advance that particular notion residence neutrality, other parts of the TFEU may
advance that goal. Note, however, that at least some cases, including tax cases, suggest that rather than promoting
residence neutrality, the TFEU aims to promote what is essentially the opposite of residence neutrality, namely,
competition for residents. This can be seen in the corporate charter competition cases such as Centros and Inspire
Art, in which the ECJ held that an EU national did not abuse its rights under the TFEU when it established a
corporate presence in a state with a favorable regulatory regime for the purpose of being governed by that regime
when it entered the market of a second member state. The ability to take advantage of a home state regulatory
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More broadly, Graetz and Warren assert that our analysis of tax discrimination is
inapplicable to capital because investors can change their residence.
observation that investors can change their residence.

We agree with their

We fail, however, to see how that

observation undercuts our interpretation of tax discrimination or renders that interpretation
inapplicable to investors (or corporations). Although investors might be readily able to move, at
any point in time, they must reside somewhere. Their investments are also located somewhere,
perhaps in many different states. Such cross-border investors could potentially be the target of
tax discrimination. Host states, for example, might seek to discourage investments (especially
controlling investments) from abroad.

Also, residence states might try to discourage their

residents from investing abroad. The EU as a whole, as well as particular investors, therefore
both stand to benefit from the prevention of such tax discrimination. We, thus, fail to see how
the ability of investors (and service providers) to change residence somehow makes tax
discrimination (which only applies to cross-border investments and provisions of services)
unimportant.105

4. The Relationship between Discrimination and Restriction
Much of the rest of Graetz and Warren’s criticism stems from their conflation of the
analytically distinct EU law concepts of “discrimination” and “restriction.” Our original article
dealt only with the former, but much of Graetz and Warren’s criticism seems to lament that we
did not address the latter.106 For example, Graetz and Warren give an example of a charity that
faces new requirements when it seeks to expand its operations into a neighboring EU member
regime when doing business abroad would promote competitive neutrality, but it would distort where corporations
choose to reside. See Case C-212/97, Centros, 1999 E.C.R. I-1459 (upholding right under the freedom of
establishment of Danish nationals to incorporate a company in the United Kingdom that did no business in the
United Kingdom, but rather was incorporated there for the express purpose of being governed by favorable U.K. law
when transacting business through a secondary establishment in Denmark), Case C-167/01, Kamer van Koophandel
en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art Ltd., 2003 E.C.R. I-10155, ¶121 (holding, on facts similar to those in
Centros, that to subject branches to the domestic corporate law of the host member state would impede their right of
establishment).
The promotion of regulatory competition also can be seen in the compensatory tax cases, such as Eurowings, in
which the ECJ held that a member states was not justified in assessing an additional tax on nonresidents to make up
for the fact that they were taxed more lightly at home. Case C-294/97, Eurowings Luftverkehrs AG v. Finanzamt
Dortmund-Unna, 1999 E.C.R. I-7447. Permitting compensatory taxation would tend to promote both locational and
residence neutrality, but it would violate competitive neutrality. Finally, as discussed in the next Part, in our view,
the mutual recognition principle promotes competitive neutrality over locational neutrality. See infra Part I.B.4.
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state.107 In Graetz and Warren’s example, the new host state applies its requirements on the
same basis to all charities operating in its territory—regardless of whether those charities are
established domestically or abroad. Because the multi-state charity must satisfy the requirements
of both its home and host states, while domestic charities need satisfy the requirements of only
one state, the charity operating across borders faces additional burdens. For example, if both the
home and host states of the charity required the charity to the keep financial records according to
national accounting rules, the charity would face duplicative burdens.
Similarly, Graetz and Warren refer to another restriction case, Cassis de Dijon.108 In
Cassis, Germany tried to exclude an imported liquor because it did not meet the minimum
alcohol content for liquor under German regulations. But the liquor, which was manufactured in
France, complied with French liquor regulations.

The German law was not facially

discriminatory; Germany did not have one set of standards for liquor manufactured abroad and
another set for liquor manufactured in Germany.

Rather, German standards simply were

different from French standards. The ECJ held that, notwithstanding the universal applicability
of the regulation, Germany imposed an “obstacle”109 on cross-border trade because goods would
have trouble satisfying the standards of both Germany and the state of manufacture. As Graetz
and Warren note, the ECJ’s solution in Cassis was to select an origin state rule for goods. This
origin state rule came to be known as the “mutual recognition” principle, and under it goods
manufactured in one member state are presumptively free to circulate throughout the European
Union, as long as they satisfy the regulatory scheme of their state of manufacture.110

So

Germany must accept the French liquor manufactured to French standards.
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Citing mutual recognition, Graetz and Warren would like the ECJ to choose a particular
state’s tax law to govern cross-border situations. Specifically, they suggest that the only sensible
way for the ECJ to enforce the prohibition on tax discrimination would be to pick one of the
following options: (1) to apply the source country’s tax system (destination state rule), (2) to
apply the residence country’s tax system (origin state rule akin to mutual recognition) or (3) to
harmonize the source and residence country’s tax systems.111 However, although Graetz and
Warren’s approach would cure restrictions that arise from the application of duplicative or
conflicting regulatory regimes like that seen in Cassis (for example, it would eliminate double
juridical taxation), it would not necessarily cure discrimination. For example, it would do
nothing to preclude source or residence rules of the following format:

“purely domestic

activities are taxed at 15%, but cross-border activities are taxed at 30%.” None of the three
proposals above by Graetz and Warren would address this problem, even though we would assert
that preventing this sort of protectionist tax law lies at the heart of the nondiscrimination project.

Relatedly, the ECJ has expressly held that the nondiscrimination principle does not require
the member states to relieve double juridical taxation.112 So the fact that Graetz and Warren’s
approach solves double juridical taxation (admittedly a major problem that tends to inhibit
integration in a common market) doesn’t mean that their approach addresses discrimination.
Double taxation, like multiple regulatory burdens, at least in the view of the ECJ so far does not
present a problem of discrimination. We would characterize double taxation, like multiple
regulatory burdens, as creating restrictions.113 That is, double taxation inhibits cross-border
commerce even though each taxing state’s regime may apply in an even-handed way (i.e.,
uniformly) to both residents and nonresidents working in the jurisdiction (or to residents’
foreign- and domestic-source income). While commentators have criticized the ECJ for failing
to adequately distinguish “discriminations” from “restrictions” in the tax area, the two concepts
can be distinguished analytically, and mutual recognition for taxation will not necessarily cure
cases of tax discrimination.

Thus, neither the multi-state charity in Graetz and Warren’s
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hypothetical nor the liquor manufacturer in Cassis faced “discrimination.”114 We would add that
probably the best U.S. analog to the restriction/discrimination dichotomy can be found in the
dormant Commerce Clause, which forbids both “discrimination” and non-discriminatory (or
“facially-neutral”) “undue burdens.”115

We did not consider tax restrictions because our project focused exclusively on
discrimination. Restrictions are a complicated subject that has produced its own jurisprudence,
literature, and debate. Restrictions are well beyond what we covered in our original article, and
there is not enough space to do them justice in this sur-reply.116 One reason that we focused in
our article on discrimination rather than restrictions is that, so far, the ECJ has decided the vast
majority of its direct tax cases under the discrimination rubric, reserving its restriction analysis
for non-tax regulations.117 That said, we offer a few brief comments here in response to Graetz
and Warren’s critique.

One reason for the ECJ’s differential treatment of taxes and non-tax regulations could be that
taxes (even when imposed by different states using different currencies) are all in money and so
are additive.118 If a tax of €10 is imposed by France on a French resident engaged in a specific
activity conducted in Germany, and a tax of €5 is imposed by Germany on that same individual
for the same activity, the total tax paid by that individual on that activity is €15. In contrast,
regulations are often not additive.119 That can be illustrated using Cassis. In Cassis, the German
regulations required a minimum alcohol content for the liquor to be sold in Germany. Because
French law was different, the product in question had a lower alcohol content than the German
minimum. Thus, to sell in Germany, the French producer would have had to change its formula
114
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for the German market. That might have been very expensive for a variety of reasons or even
impractical. To make the point more starkly, France (or another country) might have had a
regulation that did not allow the sale of alcohol above a certain level, which level was below the
German minimum. In such a case, it would not be possible to sell the same product in both
countries. Such regulations, although not discriminatory, would segment and undercut the single
market and undermine the notion that goods produced in other states should compete on the
same terms with domestic goods.

The same logic that the ECJ applied to goods in Cassis also applies with capital investments
and labor services.

Allowing both origin and destination state regulations to apply might

interfere with the single market. To eliminate restrictions (for example, to cure conflicting
regulatory burdens), a choice has to be made about which member state’s law will apply.120
Where regulations are not additive, only one of the origin state’s or the destination state’s law
can apply. In contrast, because taxes are additive, there is an option with taxes that is not
available with regulations – to permit both source and residence taxation simultaneously so long
as source and residence taxes are what we call uniform, that is, they apply the same way to all
comers. Because taxes are always additive whereas regulations are not, there is an additional
option (beyond the options Graetz and Warren consider sensible121) for designing a
competitively neutral tax system that is not available with regulations.122 That option is to
require uniform source and residence taxation.
Another reason may help explain why the mutual recognition principle, which has
successfully reduced conflicts and duplication among Member State regulatory regimes, has not
120

There is no general way to apply both origin and destination regulations without imposing very different
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been pushed into the tax area. One basis for the mutual recognition principle is that disparate
regulatory regimes in different states aim to accomplish similar policy ends. For example, even
though French and German health and consumer protection law governing the manufacture of
liquors may differ, a product manufactured to French standards will equally protect German
buyers of the product (at least up to the level of French safety standards). Thus, the presumption
under mutual recognition that goods manufactured in one member state are free to circulate in
other member state is rebuttable.123 The notion that either state’s regulation can serve both
states’ policy goals simply does not work with taxation. For example, assigning to France the
exclusive right to collect taxes on a cross-border transaction does nothing to satisfy German
revenue needs.

Interestingly, the approach the ECJ adopted in Cassis, mutual recognition of origin state
regulation, does not aim to promote locational neutrality, which seems to be Graetz and Warren’s
preferred welfare norm.124 On the contrary, mutual recognition overtly encourages regulatory
competition that will influence the location of production.

Although it does not promote

locational neutrality, mutual recognition of origin state regulation does promote competitive
neutrality, especially if the ECJ is more worried about states restricting imports than advantaging
exports.125 Thus Graetz and Warren’s citation to Cassis seems especially out-of-place because it
shows that the ECJ’s interpretation of the free movement of goods does not have much to do
with their preferred norm of locational neutrality, while at the same time it shows that the ECJ’s
interpretation of the free movement of goods readily implicates our preferred interpretation of
the fundamental freedoms as rooting out protectionism and promoting competitive neutrality.126

Furthermore, a quick look at the ECJ’s other jurisprudence on restrictions suggests that the
ECJ has been choosing between the origin and the destination state in a manner that promotes
123
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competition between domestic and foreign suppliers rather than one that promotes locational
neutrality.127 Thus, for example, the ECJ generally has decided that destination-state regulation
will control labor and services.

Accordingly, health, safety, and work rules are generally

determined by the destination state, not the origin state.128 As a result of this rule, domestic and
foreign suppliers incur the same continuing and regularly incurred costs.129 Such a rule, thus,
promotes competitive neutrality, but not locational neutrality. However, in other areas, including
the sale of goods, professional qualifications, driver’s licenses, and the regulation of finance and
broadcasting, the origin state’s regulation governs.130 These costs tend to be one-time or upfront
costs and so the alternative rule of destination-state regulation would lead suppliers to incur
duplicative costs.

Thus, this rule also promotes competitive neutrality, but not locational

neutrality.131 Although we readily acknowledge that a detailed discussion of regulations is
beyond the scope of this sur-reply, our quick look does not suggest that the ECJ’s treatment of
regulations is inconsistent with our interpretation of tax discrimination. Rather, the ECJ seems to
be trying to promote competitive neutrality, but not locational neutrality.

5. Sources of Interpretation
Graetz and Warren also claim that our sources do not support our interpretation of tax
discrimination as informed by competitive neutrality.132 We built our argument for a competitive
neutrality interpretation of tax discrimination and the fundamental freedoms on a range of
sources. We began with the Spaak Report, one of the few reports that was generally available
when the Treaty of Rome was adopted in 1956.

That report made clear that one of the

motivations behind the establishment of the European Union was to allow for the development of
EU-based multinationals that could operate on a large scale without becoming monopolies. That
127
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motivation has nothing to do with locational neutrality, but everything to do with competitive
neutrality. Thus, the Spaak report supports the notion that competitive neutrality was a value
promoted by the formation of the European Union.

We also argued that the structure and language of the EU treaties supports our
interpretation.

The treaties provide for a political process to advance harmonization, and

harmonization produces locational neutrality. Thus, we do not argue that the EU treaties provide
no mechanism for advancing locational neutrality. Rather, our argument is the fundamental
freedoms, and in particular the tax nondiscrimination principle, advance competitive neutrality
where member state law remains unharmonized.

The language of the treaties supports our interpretation.

For example, the TFEU

explicitly imposes obligations on both source and residence states under the fundamental
freedoms. The imposition of nondiscrimination obligations on both source and residence states
is consistent with competitive neutrality, but it is inconsistent with both locational neutrality and
leisure/savings neutrality. Moreover, the right of business establishment appears to be unrelated
to either locational neutrality or savings/leisure neutrality, but it is important for achieving
competitive neutrality.

We also argued that the ECJ cases fit more closely (albeit not perfectly) with competitive
neutrality than with either locational neutrality or leisure/saving neutrality. The ECJ’s opinions
regularly refer to state actions that “discourage” or “deter” cross-border activity. For the reasons
we argue in the article, that language fits more closely with competitive neutrality than with
locational or savings/leisure neutrality. Moreover, the ECJ has struck down numerous source
state tax provisions (while allowing others to stand). Such a policy makes no sense if the ECJ’s
goal is to promote locational neutrality.133

Similarly, the ECJ has struck down numerous
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residence state tax provisions (while allowing others to stand). Such a policy makes no sense if
the ECJ’s goal is to promote savings/leisure neutrality.134

In addition, other aspects of the nondiscrimination jurisprudence support a competitive
neutrality interpretation. For example, we argue that the EU doctrine of “direct effect” allows
affected parties to sue their own and other member states for tax discrimination. The doctrine of
direct effect fits comfortably with a competitive neutrality interpretation of nondiscrimination
because a tax that violates competitive neutrality harms identifiable taxpayers, whereas when
taxes compromise locational neutrality, they reduce returns for everyone, rather than for specific,
identifiable taxpayers.

Although Graetz and Warren take issue with some elements of our interpretation, they do not
challenge other elements. For example, at least in their response, they do not challenge our
interpretation of the Spaak report. But Graetz and Warren do disagree with our claim that the
right of establishment would be superfluous if the tax nondiscrimination principle were
interpreted to promote locational neutrality.135 Yet the notion that free movement of portfolio
investment (which is covered by the freedom of capital movement) is sufficient to achieve an
efficient distribution of global capital (i.e., to achieve locational neutrality) is the basis for the
standard argument that CON should not be considered an important neutrality benchmark. If
foreign direct investment by multinationals was needed to achieve locational neutrality, then the
argument for CON at the level of the firm would be closely tied with the argument for CEN.
CON would be a prerequisite for CEN. The argument that CON is not important is thus based
on a view that CEN can be achieved without CON. Of course, what this requires is that portfolio
capital be highly mobile, which it is widely acknowledged to be.

As for the cases, Graetz and Warren claim that we endorse competitive neutrality by relying
on the language of cases, but we reject locational neutrality and leisure/saving neutrality as
inconsistent with the outcomes of the cases. They claim that a more even-handed analysis would
not favor competitive neutrality, although they do not offer any examples in support of this

134
135

Savings/leisure neutrality, the term we use for CIN and its labor analog, requires source state taxation only.
Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L. J. at 1158-59.

31

claim. In our view, neither the language nor the outcomes of the cases supports a locational or
savings/leisure neutrality interpretation of the fundamental freedoms or tax discrimination. First,
we are not aware of any language in the cases that shows support for leisure/saving neutrality.
There is some language that supports locational neutrality in conjunction with competitive
neutrality (this makes sense, since the two neutrality benchmarks can be achieved simultaneously
and are at times confused for one another136). But there is also much language that explicitly
rejects locational neutrality, whereas we are not aware of language explicitly rejecting
competitive neutrality.

Finally, Graetz and Warren dispute our claim that the doctrine of direct effect provides
support for a competitive neutrality interpretation of tax nondiscrimination. They argue that
locational neutrality violations also produce winners and losers, and they offer a brief example of
two firms based in one country. One firm is purely domestic and the other is a multinational.
Graetz and Warren note that an increase in the source tax rate faced by the multinational abroad
will harm the multinational firm, but not the purely domestic firm.137 In order to evaluate their
argument, consider the following example. Assume there are two firms from Slovakia. One
firm is purely domestic, whereas the other is a multinational with operations in both Slovakia and
the Czech Republic. Assume initially that Slovakia and the Czech Republic have the same tax
system, which includes a flat 25% tax rate on corporations and only source-based corporate
taxation. The resulting tax system is locationally neutral because it is harmonized. Assume the
Czech Republic subsequently raises its corporate tax rate from 25% to 30%. That will harm the
Slovakian multinational relative to the purely domestic Slovakian firm. In that event, there is
both injury to a firm and a violation of locational neutrality. That seems to be what Graetz and
Warren have in mind when they say the doctrine of direct effect can be applied to locational
neutrality as well as competitive neutrality. But now assume that Slovakia subsequently raises
its tax rate to 30% (in order to equal to the Czech rate). That tax increase will harm Czech
multinationals with operations in Slovakia relative to purely domestic Czech firms, but it does
not compromise locational neutrality. Instead, it restores it. If taxpayer injury is being used to
identify violations of locational neutrality, this is a false positive. Assume after raising its
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corporate tax rate to 30%, the Czech Republic subsequently decides to reduce that rate back to
25% (while Slovakia maintains its 30% corporate tax rate). The resulting tax rate decrease
compromises locational neutrality. Yet, there is no injury to any firm. This is a false negative.
As the above example illustrates, injury to individual taxpayers is poorly associated with
violations of locational neutrality.

We make this point more sharply by imagining once again that Slovakia and the Czech
Republic both start out taxing corporations on a purely source basis at 25%, As noted, this
harmonized tax system is locationally neutral. Now suppose that the Czech Republic again
decides to raise its rate to 30%. As long as the Czech Republic imposes the tax uniformly, so
that it applies the same way to domestic and foreign corporations, it will create only a locational,
and not a competitive distortion. Is that tax discrimination because, on Graetz and Warren’s
reading it may injure the Slovakian multinational? If a firm were to argue that the even-handed
application by a member state of tax rates that were higher than another state’s rates were
discriminatory, the firm would lose, and it should lose. Taken at face value, if the ECJ were to
hold that a member state discriminated simply by raising its tax rates in an even-handed way for
all economic actors within its territory as Graetz and Warren suggest,138 the Court would lock in
tax policy indefinitely, or at least it would preclude tax increases.139

6. Concluding Observations
Interpreting treaties and cases is not an exact science; rarely do all of the factors point in only
one direction. At the end of the day, one is often left making a decision among a range of
plausible alternatives. An interesting question to ask in this case is: If the tax nondiscrimination
principle does not require competitive neutrality, what does it require? In this vein, we would
note that there is a substantial amount of academic commentary that has tended to interpret the
tax nondiscrimination principle as promoting competitiveness or something akin to it. Among
the prominent commentators who have taken such a position is Wolfgang Schön, who argues
138
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that “[t]he fundamental freedoms of the EC treaty . . . primarily serve to guarantee access to each
national market to economic subjects from other [m]ember [s]tates.”140 Professor Schön further
argues that “[t]he fundamental freedoms in their current shape as prohibitions of discrimination
and restrictions correspond to these requirements: on the one hand, the prohibition of
discrimination forces the country of investment or activity to establish capital import neutrality
within its domestic tax system. At the same time, the (former) country of residence of a taxpayer
must not unreasonably hinder the export of monetary, real or human capital.”141 As Graetz and
Warren point out, this is similar to the practical implication of our interpretation of tax
discrimination as promoting competitive neutrality.

Specifically, member states must limit

themselves to enacting uniform source and uniform residence rules.

Ian Roxan also interprets tax discrimination along lines similar to ours. Professor Roxan
describes the fundamental freedoms as concerned not with the “incentives to move,” but with the
“cost of movement.” In Roxan’s view, there is an incentive to move when nationals of both the
origin and destination state have an economic incentive to move (or stay) that operates in the
same direction. Thus, a higher tax rate in Estonia than Latvia encourages both Estonians and
Latvians to work in Latvia rather than in Estonia. In contrast, a cost to move operates on one
party and in one direction. A tax imposed only on Latvians who work in Estonia will discourage
Latvians from working in Estonia, but it will have no direct effect on Estonians. Although
Roxan does not use the language of CEN to describe “incentives to move” or the language of
CON to describe “cost of movement,” the notions appear to be similar.

Even Graetz and Warren in their earlier work interpreted the fundamental freedoms and tax
discrimination along the lines of competitive neutrality. For example, in a 2000 article upon
which Graetz and Warren heavily relied in their 2006 article, Warren writing alone stated that
that international tax law conceptualizes tax laws that favor domestic producers over foreign
producers as a matter of discrimination.142 In contrast, according to Warren, international tax
law conceptualizes tax policies that favor domestic production over foreign production not as a
140
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matter of discrimination, but rather as a matter of double taxation.143 Moreover in that 2000
article, Warren went on to conclude that “[t]he competitiveness norm would seem more
consistent with the current scope of prohibited discrimination than is the efficiency norm.”144
Warren equated the efficiency norm with locational neutrality or CEN.145 Although he was
primarily discussing trade and tax treaty nondiscrimination, Warren’s discussion shows that tax
discrimination has long concerned promoting competition between in-state and cross-border
actors. Thus, it is perhaps no surprise that the judges of the ECJ would come to similar
conclusions.

Drawing on Warren’s 2000 article, in their 2006 article Graetz and Warren describe tax
discrimination as concerned with discrimination against foreign producers as opposed to foreign
production.146 To us that seems very close to selecting CON over CEN as the motivating
concept behind tax discrimination.147 If that is not clear enough, they are more clear elsewhere
in that article. For example, Graetz and Warren discuss the dangers of stripping the ECJ of
power to review tax policies, which they say would likely lead to a rapid expansion of
protectionist tax legislation. They then offer a possible “middle ground between the limited
nondiscrimination requirements of international tax and trade treaties and the unduly inhibiting
version of nondiscrimination fashioned by the ECJ.”148 “One alternative,” according to Graetz
and Warren, “might be a slowing of ECJ intervention with more attention to the effect on the
member states’ fisc and a greater emphasis on protectionism as a potential middle ground. The
court’s inquiry might, for example, be directed to whether the intent of the provision was
protectionist.”149

Because competitively neutral provisions are designed to eliminate

protectionism, we read the above statement by Graetz and Warren as accepting competitive
neutrality as a reasonable interpretation of the EU concept of tax nondiscrimination, even if they
143
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do not directly advocate such an interpretation. Of course, we recognize that one can change
one’s interpretation over time, but Graetz and Warren do not acknowledge such a change or
defend a different interpretation.

And although they might have come to a different

interpretation since 2006, we believe they would be hard-pressed to deny that a competitive
neutrality interpretation is at least a reasonable and intuitive interpretation of tax
nondiscrimination.

Although each of the commentators mentioned above writes about promoting competition
through application of tax nondiscrimination, none explicitly links the interpretation of the tax
nondiscrimination principle to the public finance concept of CON (or its labor analog).
However, in the context of bilateral tax treaties, Professor Robert Green, who first used the term
CON in a published article, explicitly coined and used that phrase to describe the goals of the
nondiscrimination provisions of bilateral tax treaties.

Thus, in describing the fundamental

freedoms and tax discrimination as informed by considerations of competiveness, we are not far
removed from the views of other scholars. Both tax policy experts and members of the ECJ have
understood the prohibition of tax discrimination to promote competition between in-state and
out-of-state interests—a value we argue can be understood formally as CON and its labor analog.
In contrast, there is little support for the idea that the prohibition of tax discrimination promotes
locational neutrality, that is, that it seeks to make neutral decisions about where taxpayers work
or invest.150

As we stated in the Article, it is our hope that if members of the ECJ agree that competitive
neutrality is indeed the principle underlying their tax discrimination decisions, they will
expressly endorse it and announce it as such. That should lead to clearer, more predictable

150

We are aware of only one prominent commentator who has endorsed the view that tax discrimination is
concerned with locational neutrality. Daniel Shaviro argued that the dormant commerce clause of the U.S.
Constitution should be interpreted to promote what he calls locational neutrality, which has the characteristic that it
“minimizes the real social costs of production and ensures that low-cost producers will out-compete high-cost but
otherwise equivalent producers.” Daniel Shaviro, An Economic and Political Look at Federalism in Taxation, 90
MICH. L. REV. 895, 900 (1992). Thus, Professor Shaviro’s notion of locational neutrality is broad enough that it
encompasses competitiveness concerns as well as the allocation of assets, which is the standard interpretation of
locational neutrality.
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decisions. If the members of the ECJ instead regard some other norm as the principle underlying
tax discrimination, we urge them to expressly identify that norm.151

II.

Applying the Competitive Neutrality Interpretation of Tax Discrimination

In our original article, after arguing that the best interpretation of the tax nondiscrimination
principle is that it seeks to promote competitiveness, we described how courts could apply that
interpretation. We began the latter argument by showing what the ECJ would have to do in order
to rigorously enforce competitive neutrality in tax cases. We showed that strict adherence to
competitive neutrality requires what we called uniform source and uniform residence taxation.
We also showed that because competitive neutrality is closely related to the concept of
comparative advantage and so depends upon relative tax burdens across activities and actors,
competitive neutrality will not obtain if states use different methods for taxing cross-border
income. Accordingly, in order for taxation not to influence whether a national form one state or
another state owns an investment or takes a job, all states must agree on one of two acceptable
methods of double tax relief. We showed that competitive neutrality requires universal adoption
of either an unlimited foreign tax credit or the ideal deduction method, one instantiation of which
is exemption of foreign source income. That is not a result that is immediately obvious, but it
follows from our analysis.

We acknowledged that the ECJ does not have the power or the authority to impose these
stringent requirements (which would be even more stringent if the nondiscrimination principle
were interpreted to advance CEN or CIN152) on the member states.153 That is because the ECJ
cannot compel states to choose one or the other method of double tax relief.154 Accordingly,
drawing inspiration from the experience of the U.S. Supreme Court with a similar tax issue, we
suggested that the ECJ adopt what might be described as a variant of the U.S. “internal
consistency test.” Under this approach, the ECJ should uphold an alleged discriminatory tax as
151

Mason & Knoll (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1116.
If the nondiscrimination principle required CEN, all the member states would have to enact either residenceonly taxation or worldwide taxation with unlimited credits for source taxes. If the nondiscrimination principle
required CIN, no member state could tax on a residence basis (unless residence taxes were perfectly harmonized),
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long as the law was written in and enforced on a uniform source or residence basis.

A

challenged source tax rule is uniform if it applies the same way to workers earning income in the
jurisdiction, no matter their state of residence. A challenged residence rule is uniform if it
applies the same way to residents of the jurisdiction, no matter where they earn their income.

Thus, we made both a theoretical argument that uniform taxation combined with universal
adoption of either ideal deduction or worldwide taxation with unlimited foreign tax credits would
under ideal conditions achieve competitive neutrality and a policy argument that in the absence
of authority to impose a universal method of double tax relief (worldwide tax with unlimited
credits or ideal deduction), the ECJ should enforce the nondiscrimination principle by striking
down non-uniform tax laws.

In our article, we claimed that under the usual economic assumptions (such as frictionless
markets, no externalities, quick convergence to equilibrium, etc.) universal adoption of
worldwide taxation with unlimited foreign tax credits or ideal deduction will achieve competitive
neutrality. Graetz and Warren are careful not to say that they disagree with that claim.155 They
do, however, state that they could not follow our argument well enough to ascertain its
validity,156 and they expressed doubts that we have adequately demonstrated what we set out to
show.157 Accordingly, because our goal is to persuade and because different readers will prefer
different levels of detail in order to find an argument persuasive, we have provided a more
general derivation158 along the lines suggested by Graetz and Warren,159 and we have expanded
the example of Françoise and Günther to cover more thoroughly parts of the argument we
covered quickly in our article. These are attached as appendixes 1 and 2.

Although Graetz and Warren disagree with our interpretation of tax discrimination as
concerned with promoting competitiveness, they are willing to assume such an interpretation for
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the purpose of evaluating our enforcement claims.160

However, even assuming such an

interpretation of tax discrimination and assuming that uniform source and residence taxation are
both required for competitive neutrality, Graetz and Warren raise several direct criticisms of our
enforcement claims. In this section, we have tried to organize those criticisms according to
whether they are most directly a criticism of our theoretical argument (which Graetz and Warren
label “full competitive neutrality”) or our policy argument (which Graetz and Warren label
“partial competitive neutrality”). With respect to our theoretical claim, Graetz and Warren argue
that: (1) the ideal deduction method cannot accommodate graduated tax rates;161 (2) the ideal
deduction method, even if it works with graduated tax rates, will not work with tax base
differences that reflect personal circumstances;162 and (3) the ideal deduction method is based on
the implausible assumption that residence is fixed.163

With respect to our policy recommendation, Graetz and Warren argue that (1) our approach
to tax discrimination is unrealistic because it relies on the acceptance of one or more tax systems
that do not resemble any current, real world tax systems;164 (2) tax discrimination cannot be
discerned by looking at what just one state does, but requires consideration of the impact of
taxation by both the source and residence states.165 Finally (3), Graetz and Warren offer three
examples for us to consider, which they assert are typical of the kinds of cases any
comprehensive theory of tax discrimination must be able to handle, but for which our proposals
give no guidance.166
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Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale. L. J. at _. Graetz and Warren, however, argue that the strictness of the
conditions required for competitive neutrality is an argument against a competitive neutrality interpretation of tax
discrimination. In contrast, we view the treaties as promoting competitive neutrality and believe that no one at the
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A. Criticism of the Theoretical Claim: “Full” Competitive Neutrality
1. Ideal Deduction and Graduated Tax Rates
Graetz and Warren assert that the ideal deduction method does not work with progressive tax
rates.167 Graetz and Warren support their claim through an example involving a taxpayer (call
her Ida) who earns €10,000 at home (say Italy) where the source tax rate is 10% and €10,000
abroad (say Austria) where the source tax rate is 5%. Ida also faces a progressive Italian
residence tax structure with a 15% tax rate on the first €10,000 and 30% thereafter. As Graetz
and Warren describe, under ideal deduction, Ida will pay €1,000 in Italian source taxes and €500
in Austrian source taxes.

Under ideal deduction, Ida’s total residence taxable income is

€18,500—€20,000 less the €1,500 in Italian and Austrian source taxes—and so her residence tax
will be €4050. Graetz and Warren then ask, “how much of the residence tax is attributable to the
foreign income? Is it half . . . or 95/185? Without an answer to these questions, the taxpayer
cannot make the (necessary) calculations.”168 Graetz and Warren then continue by assuming that
the residence tax rate is zero and ask the same questions.

In order to evaluate their assertion that our approach does not work with graduated tax rates,
their example needs to be extended. Our claim is that the ideal deduction method will not distort
competitive neutrality even in the presence of a progressive residence rate structure.

Their

numerical example does not provide for a decision that could be affected by a violation of
competitive neutrality. Without a decision to make, there is not enough structure to apply our
method or test their assertion. To introduce such a decision, assume that there is an option to add
a third job either in Italy or Austria (we will call this third job Job 3I or Job 3A, depending on
whether it is located in Italy or Austria). In addition, assume there is another taxpayer, call him
Andreas, who we will assume, continuing with Graetz and Warren’s example, resides in Austria,
which does not impose a residence level tax. Andreas has the same first two jobs as Ida (one
each in Italy and Austria paying €10,000), and he is considering adding a third job, either Job 3I
or Job 3A. A second taxpayer is necessary because our claim is that the ideal deduction method
will not distort the competition between or among taxpayers, so testing our claim requires more
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than one taxpayer.169 Assuming that both taxpayers would earn €10,000 in either incremental
job (Job 3I or Job 3A),170 then, in the absence of taxation, neither one would have a comparative
advantage over the other for either job.171

This can be seen as follows. If Ida took Job 3I, she would earn an additional €10,000 in
Italy, whereas if she took Job 3A, she would earn an additional €10,000 in Austria. Thus, the
ratio of Ida’s earnings on Job 3I to her earnings on Job 3A is 1. Similarly, Andreas, because he
also earns €10,000 in either position, also has a ratio of 1. Because these ratios are the same,
neither taxpayer has a comparative advantage in seeking either position.

Now introduce taxation. Consider Andreas who resides in Austria, which has no residence
taxation. Given a 10% source tax rate in Italy, he will earn, if he takes Job 3I, €10,000, pay
€1,000 in tax, and be left with €9,000. Alternatively, if he takes Job 3A, he will receive €10,000
pay €500 in Austrian source tax, and be left with €9,500. Thus, the ratio of his incremental aftertax earnings from taking Job 3I to his incremental after-tax earnings from taking Job 3A is .947.
Now consider Ida, who resides in Italy and is subject to progressive residence taxation. If she
takes the third job in Italy, she earns an additional €10,000, pays an additional €3,350 in tax, and
is left with an €6,650.172 Alternatively, if she takes the third job in Austria, she still earns an
additional €10,000; she pays an additional €3,700 in tax and is left with an additional €6,300.173
Thus, the ratio of her incremental after-tax earnings from taking her third job in Italy to her
incremental after-tax earnings from taking her third job in Austria is .947. Because the ratios are
the same for Andreas and Ida, the tax system has not compromised competitive neutrality. Note
169

It is widely accepted that taxation will reduce the incentive to work. The debate is over the magnitude of the
effect and the importance of the income effect. The substitution effect of a higher income tax rate is to reduce work.
In the language of international taxation, this would be a violation of the labor analogue of CIN.
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Ida’s incremental cash flow is calculated as follows. Her €10,000 in earnings in Austria incurs Austrian
source tax liability of €500. She reports €9,500 income to Italy, her state of residence. At her 30% marginal tax
rate, she pays €2,850 more in residence tax. Thus, her total tax obligation on the incremental €10,000 is €3,350,
which leaves her with an incremental €6,650 after all taxes.
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Ida’s incremental cash flow is calculated as follows. Her €10,000 in earnings in Italy incurs Italian source
tax liability of €1,000. She reports €9,000 income to Italy, her state of residence. At her 30% marginal tax rate, she
pays another €2,700 in Italian residence tax. Thus, her total tax obligation is €3,300, which leaves her with an
incremental €6,700 after all taxes.
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that the progressive tax system has not compromised competitive neutrality, even though the tax
rates differ across the taxpayers. Competitive neutrality is not compromised, in spite of the
different tax rates, because each taxpayer is subject to the same schedule regardless of which job
he or she takes.174 Thus, not only does our approach accommodate progressive taxation, but it
allows each state flexibility in determining its own schedule of progressive tax rates (i.e., it does
not require rate harmonization).

This outcome is more respectful of member state tax

sovereignty and national tax interests than are, for example, Graetz and Warren’s suggestions for
various methods of tax harmonization.175

2. Ideal Deduction and the Tax Base
Graetz and Warren also claim that the ideal deduction method is not compatible with tax
base differences that reflect differences in personal circumstances.176 They do not provide an
argument or an example to support their assertion. Accordingly, we constructed the following
example to illustrate how such differences can be incorporated into ideal deduction without
compromising competitive neutrality.

Consider similar jobs in Bulgaria and Romania. The jobs in both states can be filled by
residents of either state. Consider a job that pays €100 a week in Romania, which has a 20%
source tax. A worker who takes such a job will receive €80 after paying the Romanian source
tax. Assume that Bulgaria, which has a 50% source tax, has a provision in its tax law that allows
a taxpayer with Bulgarian-source income a deduction against that income for certain personal
circumstances. The deduction is offered on a uniform source basis—that is, it is available to
both Bulgarian and non-Bulgarian residents who work in Bulgaria. Assume further that for a
certain category of workers, those deductions total €20. For now, assume that neither country
assesses residence-based taxes. Assuming a competitive market for workers between Bulgaria
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The logic is the same for the more complex example to which Graetz and Warren make a brief reference.
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and Romania (and that prices in Bulgaria are determined by prices in Romania), the Bulgarian
job will pay €140 a week in equilibrium. A worker who takes a job in Bulgaria earns €140, takes
a €20 deduction, and so reports taxable income of €120. At a 50% Bulgarian source tax rate, the
worker pays €60 in tax, and so is left with €80. In this simple example, both Bulgarian and
Romanian residents earn €80 after source taxation, regardless of where they work.
Consequently, workers are indifferent as to whether to work in Bulgaria or Romania and there is
no competitive distortion from the tax system, despite the differences in deductions available in
Romania and Bulgaria. 177

In contrast, if the Bulgarian tax system does not offer the deduction uniformly to both
Bulgarians and Romanians working in Bulgaria, then the tax system will not be neutral with
respect to the decision of which job to take. If Romanians are denied the deduction, then
assuming the Bulgarian job pays €140, Romanians will take home only €70 when they work in
Bulgaria.178 They will then prefer to work in Romania (where their take home pay is €80) rather
than Bulgaria (where their take home pay is €70). Thus, the nonuniform tax system will have
had the effect of distorting the matching of workers with jobs.179 Thus nonuniformly applied
differences in tax bases will distort competition, and should, under our analysis, be struck down
as discriminatory by the ECJ.

This example can be extended from an exemption system to the ideal deduction method
by introducing the possibility of residence taxation in addition to source taxation. Assume
Bulgaria has a uniform 10% residence tax that is assessed on the after-source-tax income of
177

That there is no competitive distortion from the Bulgarian and Romanian source taxes can be shown as
follows: The relative productivity of Romanians working in Romania (€140) relative to Bulgaria (€100) as
compared with Bulgarians working in Romania (€140) relative to Bulgaria (€100) is equal to 1. That is because
((€140/€100)/(€140/€100)) is equal to 1. Similarly, the relative after-tax wage of Romanians working in Romania
(€80) relative to Bulgaria (€80) as compared with Bulgarians working in Romania (€80) relative to Bulgaria (€80) is
also equal to 1. Because the tax system has not altered the ratio of after-tax wages across states such that it differs
from the ratio of before-tax productivity, there is no distortion.
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That the non-uniform Bulgarian tax base distorts the competition between Bulgarians and Romanians for
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Bulgaria (€70) as compared with Bulgarians working in Romania (€80) relative to Bulgaria (€80) is equal to 1.14.
In contrast, the relative productivity of Romanians working in Romania (€140) relative to Bulgaria (€100) as
compared with Bulgarians working in Romania (€140) relative to Bulgaria (€100) is still equal to 1. Thus, because
the non-uniform Bulgarian tax base has not altered the ratio of after-tax wages across states (1.14) such that it differs
from the ratio of before-tax productivity across states (1), there is a distortion. The distortion will encourage the
Romanians to work at home rather than Bulgaria.
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Bulgarian residents regardless of where they earn their income. Because Bulgarian residents
earn €80 after paying Bulgarian or Romanian source tax, they will pay €8 in Bulgarian residence
tax and be left with €72 after both source and residence taxes. Assume Romania imposes a 30%
residence tax on the after-source-tax income of Romanian residents regardless of where that
income is earned. Assume in addition that Romania provides a €30 deduction to offset some
specified personal circumstance. Assuming that the Romanian personal deduction is available
on a uniform residence basis, which is to say that Romanian residents receive the deduction on
the same terms, no matter whether the source of their income is Romania or Bulgaria, then
Romanians will report €50 in residence income (the €80 after-source-tax amount less the €30
deduction) to Romania, pay €15 tax, and be left with €65 after all taxes regardless of where they
work. Because Bulgarians and Romanians are still indifferent as to where they work, the tax
system has not distorted the competition between Bulgarians and Romanians for jobs.180 Notice
that our approach accommodates source- or residence-based tax base differences. As long as
states apply their tax bases uniformly—on a uniform source basis to all taxpayers working in the
jurisdiction no matter their state of tax residence and on a uniform residence basis to all residents
no matter the source of their income—tax bases can differ across states.

This last point is worth emphasizing. The tax systems just described, including the tax base
adjustments, do not distort the competition among nationals from different states for jobs
because the tax rates and bases are uniformly applied, despite the wide variety of entitlements
available to taxpayers in the different scenarios presented here. In our example, a Romanian
resident who works at home receives one €30 deduction that is worth €15 after-all-taxes,
whereas a Romanian resident who works in Bulgaria receives two deductions (one from
Romania and one from Bulgaria) totaling €50 that are together worth €19 after-all-taxes.
However, a Bulgarian who works in Romania does not receive any deductions, whereas a
Bulgarian who works in Bulgaria receives one €20 deduction that is worth €4 after-all-taxes.
Nonetheless, in spite of the differing numbers of deductions (0, 1, or 2), their total amounts (0,
€15, €20, or €50), and their after-tax values (0, €4, €15, or €19), there is no violation of
180

More formally, the uniform Bulgarian and Romanian residence taxes (including the uniform deduction) have
not compromised competitive neutrality. There is no distortion because the relative after-tax wage of Romanians
working in Romania (€65) relative to Bulgaria (€65) as compared with Bulgarians working in Romania (€72)
relative to Bulgaria (€72) is equal to 1, which is also the ratio of their relative productivities.
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competitive neutrality. There is no violation because each state confers the deductions on either
a uniform source or a uniform residence basis. Moreover, attempts to equalize the number, total
amount, or value of the deductions (without harmonizing rates and bases) will compromise
competitive neutrality. Thus, the deductions a taxpayer receives (i.e., the tax base) can differ
depending upon where a worker resides and works without introducing competitive distortions,
as long as the deductions (i.e., any tax base differences) apply on either a uniform source or
uniform residence basis. This is an important advantage of competitive neutrality—it can be
implemented without the need to harmonize tax bases, which allows member state to retain
significant autonomy to pursue policies through their tax codes.

3. Ideal Deduction and the Assumption of Fixed Residence
Graetz and Warren argue that our results are severely limited by our assumption of fixed
residence. According to Graetz and Warren, the fixed residence assumption implies that the
ideal deduction method will not work to ensure competitive neutrality either when the worker
has to move in order to change jobs or when the relevant taxpayer is an investor (or a
corporation).181 In effect, they claim that the usual tax residence rule (a taxpayer becomes a
resident of any state in which he resides for 6 or more months) will create a distortion that will
interact with other distortions such that ideal deduction will not produce a competitively neutral
equilibrium. We believe Graetz and Warren overstate their case markedly.

As we stated in our article, the residence rule can create a distortion only when the
competition involves jobs that cross the residence threshold, i.e., non-commuting jobs lasting
longer than six months.182

As Graetz and Warren recognize, if one is competing for a series of short jobs, such as the
example Graetz and Warren provide of an opera singer who will give 20 performances over the
181
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more than one state (for example, because they cross national borders daily), residence-tie-breaker rules in bilateral
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within our analysis. See OECD Model Tax Treaty, art. 4. Thus, the class of workers that concern Graetz and
Warren are only those who have to move to the work state for six months or more in order to be able to perform the
job.
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year, then because each performance is a short-term job, the decision to accept or not a particular
engagement will not affect the singer’s tax residence.183 Thus, the same residence tax system
will apply regardless of the job choices and so the residence rule does not distort job selection.
Hence, it does not interfere with competitive neutrality.

Next, consider positions that practically require the taxpayer take up residence in the state
where the work is performed in order to accept the position. Almost any long-term job requiring
the service to be performed regularly on site and which is located far from a border would fall
into this category. There are many such examples, including doctors, executives, and clerks.
Graetz and Warren claim that such jobs are outside the scope of our project. They are correct in
the sense that if one changes his or her residence in order to take such a job there is no issue of
tax discrimination regardless of how the new state taxes because the taxpayer both resides and
works in the same state, and the prohibition of tax discrimination applies only in cross-border
cases, not in “purely internal” cases.

True enough, but note that, contrary to Graetz and

Warren’s claim, there also would not be a competitiveness problem if the new state of residence
imposes ideal deduction with uniform source and residence taxes as we suggest. In such cases,
there is taxation by only one state, although such a tax might be in two jurisdictional postures
(source and residence). Thus, ideal deduction and uniform taxation promotes competitiveness
between nationals from different states (including those who change their state of residence
subsequent to moving for a job).

As we described in our article, the only circumstances in which the residence rule can create
distortions is when employment crosses the residence threshold.184 If, for example, a job can last
4 months (in which case residence remains as before the job) or 8 months (in which case
residence shifts to the new location), then there can be a distortion that can affect the competition
for work. That is certainly possible, but it would not seem to be common.185
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Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1151. Their objection with the opera example is to graduated tax
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Graetz and Warren also assert that our analysis is inapplicable to capital whether owned by
an individual or a corporation. Again, they do not specify their argument. What they seem to be
asserting is that our claim that ideal deduction (and worldwide taxation with unlimited foreign
tax credits) will achieve competitive neutrality only holds under the assumption that residence is
fixed. But investors (and corporations) can readily change their residence. Therefore, Graetz &
Warren seem to imply that ideal deduction (or worldwide taxation with unlimited credits) will
not produce competitive neutrality for capital investments because investors (and corporations)
are free to move away from their capital. Although we agree that many investors can readily
change their place of residence, we disagree with the conclusion that such freedom somehow
implies that ideal deduction (or worldwide taxation) will not achieve competitive neutrality. In
contrast with work, which forces most people either to live near where they work or to change
jobs, investors generally do not need to live near their investments. For such investors, the
residence choice can be largely divorced from the investment choice. Thus, wherever such
investors reside, they are likely to hold investments elsewhere. Accordingly, to protect such
investors from protectionist legislation, the uniformity requirements with ideal deduction are
needed.186

B. Criticism of the Policy Claim: “Partial” Competitive Neutrality
1. Ideal Deduction is Unrealistic
We now shift to Graetz and Warren’s criticisms of our policy recommendation that courts, in
the absence of the ability to enforce all of the requirements of “full competitive neutrality,”
should require uniform source and residence taxation. Graetz and Warren argue that even if we
are correct that ideal deduction will preserve competitive neutrality when there are differences in
tax bases and progressivity, the tax systems we discuss and describe are so far removed from real
world tax systems as to be impractical.187 We have several responses here.

incentive to avoid residence in the high-tax state. Hence, arguably even in this circumstance, there is no violation of
competitive neutrality.
186
See supra note _ - _ and accompanying text
187
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First, as Graetz and Warren recognize, it is common to analyze international tax policy using
ideal types such as exemption and worldwide taxation with unlimited foreign tax credits.188
Graetz and Warren themselves employ this technique in their own work, and our analysis in
terms of ideal deduction is similar. It is useful to understand the ideal forms that must be
employed to achieve specific tax neutrality benchmarks even when any real world system is
likely to fall short of that goal.189

Second, the ideal deduction method is in fact closer to actual practice than Graetz and
Warren acknowledge. Exemption is a form of ideal deduction. Under an exemption system that
also satisfies the requirements of ideal deduction, the first stage of taxation would consist of
uniform source taxes at whatever rate each source country selects autonomously, and the second
stage would be uniform residence taxation where every country sets the residence tax rate to
zero.

Most of the member states already employ exemption tax systems (although none

implements exemption perfectly, which they would all have to do to achieve full competitive
neutrality).

Moreover, there are real world examples of two-stage taxation in which the second stage tax
rate is not set to zero. For example, many aspects of the social welfare and support system that
are administered through the tax laws have these qualities. Such provisions are often granted on
a uniform residence basis, despite the taxation of earned income taxed on a source basis.190
However, the clearest example of the ideal deduction method is the classical corporate income
tax. With such a tax, the corporation is taxed on its income and the investor is taxed on the same
income. The investor is typically taxed on dividends, which are clearly and explicitly an aftertax cash flow, and capital gains, which are implicitly so. Thus the classical double tax system is
one in which the source country taxes the profits to the corporation, and the residence country
taxes the after-tax profits (i.e., the corporate profits after deduction of source state corporate
taxes) to the shareholder. This is similar to how the ideal deduction method works—the source
188
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Proponents of eliminating deferral of taxation of foreign corporate income often defend that policy on the
ground that such a change would move the tax system closer to CEN. However, few, if any, of those proponents
would endorse all the steps, including unlimited foreign tax credits, necessary to achieve CEN.
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state taxes the worker’s earned income, and then the residence state taxes the same income after
allowing a deduction for source taxes.

Moreover, states often impose a withholding tax on dividends paid to foreign shareholders.
Because such a tax is not imposed on dividends paid to domestic shareholders, the dividend
withholding tax represents a differential (i.e., non-uniform) treatment of foreign and domestic
shareholders. The effect of that differential treatment is to discourage foreign shareholders
relative to domestic shareholders from investing in domestic companies. As Graetz and Warren
recognize, bilateral treaties tend to reduce withholding tax rates.191 By doing so, they are moving
the tax system’s treatment of investments in corporations closer to ideal deduction.192

2. One-State or Multistate Approach
In our article, we argued that one advantage of adopting the requirement of uniformity as the
key enforcement guideline for tax discrimination is that it would make tax discrimination cases
reasonably straightforward to resolve because, among other reasons, the courts would only have
to look at the law of one state to determine whether that state discriminated.193 If a law is
uniform either on a source or residence basis, the law is not discriminatory; otherwise it is
discriminatory. Graetz and Warren see our one-state approach, not as an advantage, but as a
failing. In their words, “[o]ur own view is that any serious attempt to identify the tax advantages
or disadvantages for cross-border income should take account of the tax consequences in both
countries.”194 Graetz and Warren provide no reasons, arguments or examples to support that
assertion. That makes it difficult to respond. What they might have in mind is given by the
following example.
191
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Assume Finland taxes (non-corporate) investments in Finland by domestic residents at 40%
and that Finland also taxes inbound (non-corporate) investments at a higher rate, say 50%.195
This scheme violates the uniformity rule because it applies different source tax rules to residents
and nonresidents. Therefore, we would say that the Finnish tax system discriminates against
nonresidents.

Assume, however, that Sweden, which taxes both Swedes and non-Swedes at 30% on their
(non-corporate) investments in Sweden, also provides a 10% subsidy to Swedes who make (noncorporate) investments in Finland. The Swedish subsidy exactly offsets the incremental burden
of the non-uniform Finnish tax on Swedes investing in Finland. In such circumstances, the tax
systems of Sweden and Finland taken together achieve CON. Moreover, if our uniformity rule is
adopted by the ECJ, and the result is that Finland reduces the tax rate on inbound investors from
50% to 40%, the resulting tax system will not be competitively neutral as long as Sweden
continues to subsidize its residents’ investments in Finland. Swedes will have a tax-induced
advantage when acquiring (non-corporate) assets in Finland. In contrast, a more exhaustive
approach that looked at both source and residence states would recognize that the Swedish
subsidy offsets the higher Finnish tax and would lead to the correct result.

We offer two observations in response.

First, the Swedish subsidy is a non-uniform

residence subsidy, and as such, it will create competitive distortions when it interacts with the
uniform (i.e., competitively neutral) source tax rules of member states other than Finland. Thus,
upholding Finland’s non-uniform source tax because Sweden has a non-uniform residence tax
that just happens to perfectly offset the competitive distortion introduced by Finland against
Swedes does little to advance competitive neutrality overall. In any case where the residence
state, unlike Sweden, does not enact a compensatory subsidy to overcome its residents’ adverse
treatment in Finland, the non-uniform Finnish source tax will violate competitive neutrality.
Thus, a two-state (or multistate) approach raises the possibility that the same Finnish residence

195

If Finland provided its resident taxpayers with a 10% subsidy on their foreign investments, then the Finnish
tax system would be uniform on both a source and residence basis, so to make things simple, we further assume
further that Finland does not tax residents on their income from foreign investments.
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rule could be held to be nondiscriminatory when applied to Swedes, but discriminatory when
applied to residents of other EU member states.196

It, thus, follows that the complexity of the ECJ’s requisite analysis multiplies as the number
of member states increases. That can be seen by extending the example. Consider a third
country, Estonia, which taxes both Estonians and non-Estonians at 20% on non-corporate
investments in Estonia and which does not generally tax Estonians on their income from foreign
investments. Such a tax scheme is competitively neutral because it is uniform (and therefore we
would say it is nondiscriminatory). But in order for the (non-uniform) Finnish tax system to
maintain competitive neutrality when applied to inbound investment Estonians, Estonia must
provide its residents with a 10% subsidy when they invest in Finland, but not when they invest in
Sweden.

Consider now a fourth country, Latvia, which similar to Finland taxes nonresidents at a
higher rate than residents on their (non-corporate) investments in Latvia. Assume Latvia taxes
Latvians at 20%, but it taxes non-Latvians at 35%. Assuming Latvia does not generally tax its
residents on their foreign source (non-corporate) investment income, Latvia still must provide a
10% subsidy for Latvians investing in Finland in order for the Finnish tax system not to
compromise competitive neutrality. In addition, Finland must provide its residents with a 15%
subsidy when investing in Latvia to maintain competitive neutrality. Moreover, Sweden and
Estonia, which already must provide their residents who invest in Finland a 10% subsidy to
prevent Finland from violating competitive neutrality, must also provide their residents with a
15% subsidy when investing in Latvia to prevent Latvia from violating competitive neutrality.

As the number of member states expands, the complexity increases. With 28 member states,
the analysis would be very complex and cumbersome.197 And for what purpose? How likely is
it that any single state’s discriminatory tax policy would be perfectly offset by the policies of all
196

Likewise, if the ECJ began to strike down cases of “reverse discrimination,” the Swedish nonuniform
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the 27 other member states? Presumably, very unlikely. (Talking about holy grails!) And at
what cost? The data requirements would be extensive; the litigation costs would likely be very
large; and the judicial system will provide less useful guidance. And it is even possible that the
TFEU’s prohibition on state aids would be interpreted to limit the states’ use of such
compensatory subsidies.198

The doctrine of the U.S. Supreme Court is instructive in this area. The Court has refused to
analyze the impact of other states’ tax laws when considering whether a defendant state engaged
in tax discrimination in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause, even though other states’
rules may interact with the tax rules of the defendant state. According to the Supreme Court, the
constitutionality of the accused state’s tax law should not “depend on the shifting complexities of
the tax codes of 49 other States.”

199

Because we agree with this line of thinking, we would

argue that the ECJ has taken the wrong path on those occasions when it has taken a two-state
approach. Rather, each state’s tax law must stand or fall on its own merits.

Our second observation is that in order to compensate its residents for the non-uniform
source tax imposed by Finland (Finland taxes domestic investors at 40%, but foreigners at 50%),
Sweden provides a 10% subsidy on its residents’ investment that is outbound to Finland. This
means that Sweden expends its public resources to maintain a level tax playing field for its
residents who invest in Finland. Sweden forgoes 10%, and Finland receives an extra 10%. This
creates a revenue shift that rewards Finland for its discrimination.

3. Three Examples
Graetz and Warren give three examples and argue that a competitive neutrality approach to
nondiscrimination would not clarify how to resolve them. Earlier we discussed the first example,
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which involved a charity that was subject to a restrictive regulation in another member state. We
will not revisit that example here, except to note that our goal was to provide guidance in
discrimination cases, not necessarily in restriction cases.

The second example offered by Graetz and Warren involves corporate tax integration. They
ask whether a country that grants tax credits to resident individuals for corporate taxes paid on
local source income (e.g., imputation credits) should be required to extend those credits to cover
corporate taxes paid to foreign governments on foreign source income.200

That is a very

important question. As mentioned above and in our article, we have tried to avoid discussing
corporate tax examples in our original article and this sur-reply, even though our approach has
applications in that area, because of the extensive background and detail that would be required
to address those issues. At the risk of not adequately preparing interested readers not familiar
with the complexities of corporate taxation (both domestic and international), we will respond
briefly to the challenge.

We start by recognizing that it is possible to talk about competitive neutrality in the corporate
tax context (i.e., CON) at two levels: the level of the corporation making investments and the
level of investors in the firm. The combination of a uniform and flat source tax on corporations
and a uniform (although not necessarily flat) residence tax on investors will achieve competitive
neutrality at both levels. Accordingly, granting such credits on a uniform source or residence
basis will preserve competitive neutrality. Thus, if the country grants the imputation credit on a
residence basis, it would have to extend it to all residents, including those who have foreignsource corporate dividends. In contrast, if the country grants the imputation credit on a source
basis (i.e., against all dividends issued by resident corporations), the credit would have to apply
to all dividends sourced within the territory, whether the shares were owned by resident or
foreign shareholders.201 However, granting the credit on a non-uniform source or a non-uniform
residence basis (i.e., imputation credits only for resident shareholders of resident companies)
would disrupt competitive neutrality on at least one level and possibly at both levels.202
200
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If the imputation credit is granted on a source basis, then for the shares held by foreign investors the source
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The third example offered by Graetz and Warren is that of a same sex couple who marries in
one state where such marriages are recognized but who, in order to take jobs, subsequently
moves (long enough to establish tax residency) to a second state that does not recognize such
marriages. Graetz and Warren ask whether the second state should be required to recognize their
marriage. According to Graetz and Warren, if the second state fails to recognize the marriage,
the couple will be dissuaded from moving to the second state in order to take jobs for which
they, by hypothesis, have a comparative advantage.203

The conclusion that they will be

persuaded from moving, however, does not follow. Assuming that the relevant jobs in the
second state require residence there as a practical matter, then everyone competing for those jobs
has to be a resident of that state (i.e., we’re in a purely internal situation). In such circumstances,
everyone who competes for those jobs will be subject to the local rules, including the rule failing
to recognize same-sex marriages.204 Thus, the rule applies to everyone considering taking the
job (i.e., it is uniform), and therefore will not violate competitive neutrality.

If Graetz and Warren mean that differences in marriage law across different member states
will affect residence decisions; they are correct.

But there is no evidence that the

nondiscrimination principle of the TFEU aims to make residence decisions neutral, indeed, there
is much evidence of the opposite. The intent in the EU appears to be, at least in part, to set up
regulatory competition among the member states, and although this may have originally
primarily encompassed competition for economic regulation, member states also compete for
residents though social regulation. There is much evidence in cases that one of the overarching
goals of the TFEU is to create regulatory competition, at least in those areas (including direct
tax) not harmonized at the EU level.205
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III.

Conclusion

In their 2006 article, Graetz and Warren argued that the ECJ’s tax discrimination
jurisprudence accorded with neither CEN nor CIN.206 We agree with that conclusion.207 Graetz
and Warren further argued (relying on the well-known proof of the impossibility of
simultaneously achieving both CEN and CIN without harmonizing taxes) that because CEN
would impose nondiscrimination obligations only on residence states, and CIN would impose
obligations only on source states, the simultaneous imposition of nondiscrimination obligations
on both source and residence states was incoherent and erected, in their terms, a “labyrinth of
impossibility.”208

It is with this latter conclusion that we disagreed. In our view, imposition by the ECJ of
nondiscrimination obligations at both source and residence does not necessarily show that the
Court was trying to do the impossible by trying to enforce both CEN and CIN, a goal that is
impossible to achieve in the absence of tax rate harmonization. Instead, our argument is that
imposition of nondiscrimination obligations at both source and residence is consistent with
competitive neutrality—an efficiency norm that Graetz and Warren did not consider in 2006.
One virtue of reconciling the imposition of nondiscrimination obligations at both source and
residence with a coherent efficiency goal is that, as we say in the article, it accords with the
intuition that “states may impermissibly discriminate in either capacity: when taxing in a source
capacity, they may discriminate between resident and nonresident workers; when taxing in a
residence capacity, they may discriminate between residents’ foreign and domestic income.”209
We also argued that a competitive neutrality interpretation of nondiscrimination fits the ECJ
jurisprudence better than does either CEN or CIN. And we argued that a competitive neutrality
interpretation of the tax nondiscrimination principle can be supported by the language of the
treaty, history, and the policy goals of political and economic union (although we did not attempt
the kind of through-going normative analysis that would enable us to conclude that competitive
neutrality is the best possible interpretation of the tax nondiscrimination principle from an
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efficiency perspective).210 We regard as a separate question whether one ought to interpret the
nondiscrimination principle as promoting competitive neutrality if one were choosing an
efficiency norm for the European Union from scratch and were not constrained by the existing
EU treaties and the ECJ’s interpretations of those treaties. Indeed, as Graetz and Warren point
out, in our article we concede that many economists would regard locational distortions as more
welfare-reducing than competitive distortions.211

Our project, then, stands in contrast with that of Graetz and Warren’s. They examined the
substantive outcomes in tax cases and criticized the ECJ’s infringement on EU member states’
tax sovereignty. Tax policy, in Graetz and Warren’s view, ought to be made by the member
states, not the ECJ. At times, therefore, Graetz and Warren seem to advocate that the ECJ should
abandon its nondiscrimination jurisprudence. For example, they state that our own analysis
“confirm[s their] view that constitutional courts should not be making tax policy based on
abstract and contradictory principles of nondiscrimination.”212 But while we acknowledge that
nondiscrimination principles are notoriously slippery, it is not clear what alternative the ECJ has
to deciding such cases. The TFEU clearly provides that member states may not discriminate
against EU nationals when they exercise their fundamental freedoms. Likewise, the TFEU
provides a clear procedure for national courts to refer to the ECJ questions of EU law for
preliminary ruling.213 The ECJ cannot simply reject such ruling requests, and to do so would
simply result in even more haphazard results, as there would be no supranational court that could
reconcile the conflicting interpretations of the TFEU by national courts. Thus, notwithstanding
that nondiscrimination cases are difficult to handle—and that, as a policy matter Graetz and
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Warren have a preference for tax policy issues to be decided by legislatures, not courts—the ECJ
must resolve them.

An alternative that might satisfy Graetz and Warren might be for the member states to strip
the ECJ of its jurisdiction to hear tax cases.

Although this move was considered in the

negotiations over the EU Constitution, the member states rejected it.214 The member states
apparently regard the ECJ’s jurisprudence in this area to be worth both any confusion it presently
generates and any infringement of their tax sovereignty. This is not a difficult conclusion to
understand, when we consider the importance of the fundamental freedoms to the operation of a
single market and the kinds of national tax schemes that the ECJ has struck down. Among other
domestic business tax provisions, the ECJ has struck down (1) a law that taxed foreign banks at a
higher rate than domestic banks,215 (2) a law that allowed trade tax deductions for rental
payments made to domestic (but not foreign) companies,216 and (3) a law that allowed payment
of interest on tax refunds to resident, but not nonresident, taxpayers.217 Similarly, the Court
struck down a tax provision that allowed deduction of professional training expenses if the
training took place domestically, but created a rebuttable presumption that professional training
expenses for courses taking place abroad were nondeductible because they involved a significant
tourism element.218

The Court also has invalidated individual tax provisions that allowed

residents, but not nonresidents who earned all or almost all their income in the defendant state, to
(1) deduct pension contributions,219 (2) enjoy the benefits of marital joint filing,220 and (3) deduct
other personal and family expenses.221 Similarly, the Court has held that states may not establish
significantly more onerous tax administrative procedures for nonresidents than residents,
214
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may states allow residents, but not nonresidents, to deduct fees for tax advice.223 Without an
enforcement of the legal prohibition on tax discrimination, such protectionist provisions would
remain in place indefinitely, hampering cross-border commerce. Indeed, the absence of any
enforcement would invite the member states to enact more protectionist tax policies.
Additionally, because EU-wide tax legislation requires the unanimous agreement of the member
states, it is extremely difficult for the member states to eliminate tax discrimination via
legislation.224 Thus, the imperfect instrument of the tax nondiscrimination principle, and its
enforcement by the ECJ, remain the most important method for removing tax barriers to crossborder commerce in the European Union.

The other alternative suggestion made by Graetz and Warren would constrain member states
far more than would our proposal to make explicit the notion that the nondiscrimination principle
in the TFEU requires competitive neutrality. Graetz and Warren argue that, to be consistent, the
ECJ must take the same approach in the direct tax area that it has taken in the area of regulation
of goods. Namely, the Court should choose among three options: (1) it could apply only the
source country’s tax rules (destination state rule), or (2) it could apply only the residence state’s
tax rules (origin state rule equivalent to the mutual recognition principle seen in Cassis), or (3)
the EU legislature could harmonize the source and residence state rules. Since the ECJ has no
authority to accomplish (3), its choice presumably lies between (1) and (2). But the TFEU
provides no guidelines for the choice between (1) and (2), and making that choice arguably falls
outside the institutional competence of the ECJ. Moreover, forcing the ECJ to make such a
dramatic choice strikes us as an odd recommendation coming from Graetz and Warren, who
claim to be concerned that the ECJ has delved too far into national tax policy matters that are
better left to the legislatures of the individual states. In contrast, under a competitive neutrality
interpretation of nondiscrimination, both the source and residence states can continue to apply
their autonomously drafted national tax laws, provided that those laws apply uniformly to
domestic and cross-border situations.
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According to Professors Graetz and Warren, we are “stuck in a labyrinth of impossibility”
searching for the “holy grail of tax discrimination.”225 However, we are not working in the realm
of mythology where the gods have all the answers, or theoretical physics, where the right answer
causes all of the pieces to fall in line perfectly. Instead, we are dealing with flesh and blood
judges and legislators—the men and women who drafted the foundational documents, who wrote
the tax laws, and who must decide the cases and issue their opinions. To require 100 percent
explanatory power for any theory or interpretation is unrealistic and to impose such a
requirement is to ensure that the only possibility is to continue to muddle through with little hope
for more coherence or better results.
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Appendix I
Derivation

In this Appendix, we seek to provide a simple example that explains our basic results for
when taxation will and will not distort competitive neutrality. This appendix, thus, responds to
the request by Graetz and Warren to provide more support for our claims that various tax
systems either will or will not promote competitive neutrality.

Because our claims about

competitive neutrality apply to both labor and capital, in this Appendix we use capital. With
only slight variation, the example could be turned into a labor example.

Consider an economy with only two countries, Portugal and Italy, denoted P and I. Assume
Italy is much larger than Portugal and that Italy sets market prices in the economy. Investors can
readily invest all the capital they want in a riskless benchmark asset without affecting its rate of
return. The benchmark asset, located in Italy, pays a before-tax annual rate of return of b. A
party from Italy and a party from Portugal are both considering investing in a riskless alternative
asset, C, which is assumed to be located in Portugal. There is only one unit of asset C available.
Both parties have more than enough cash available to purchase the entire amount of the
alternative asset.

Any funds not invested in the alternative asset will be invested in the

benchmark asset. The alternative asset, which is fully divisible, will pay C once a year in
perpetuity. If all of the alternative asset is owned by the Portuguese investor he will receive CP
and if it is all owned by the Italian investor, she will receive CI. Denote the value of the
alternative asset by V. Thus, the value of the alternative asset to the Portuguese investor, VP, is
given by the following expression:
.

(1)

Similarly, the value of the alternative asset to the Italian investor, VI, is given by the
following expression:
.

(2)

Obviously, if the parties place different values on the asset, it will be fully acquired by the
party who values it the most. Thus, the Portuguese investor will acquire the asset if and only if
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he values the asset more than the Italian investor. Gathering terms, the above statement implies
that:
1.

(3)

It is clear from equation (3) that the alternative asset will be acquired by the party who can
produce more value with the asset. Thus, in the absence of taxation competitive neutrality will
obtain.1

The next step is to introduce taxes. Denote the total tax rate by T with a subscript to denote
residence and a superscript to denote source. Thus, TII denotes the total tax rate of an Italian
resident on an investment in Italy (the benchmark asset). Similarly, TIP denotes the total tax rate
of a Italian resident on an investment in Portugal (the alternative asset). Likewise, TPI denotes
the total tax rate of a Portuguese resident on an investment in Italy. Finally, TPP denotes the total
tax rate of a Portuguese resident on an investment in Portugal.

It follows that the Portuguese

resident will earn an after-tax annual return of (1- TPI)b if he invests in the benchmark asset,
whereas the Italian resident will earn (1- TII)b if she invests in the benchmark asset. Similarly,
the after-tax return the Portuguese resident will earn if he invests in the alternative asset is (1TPP)CP, whereas the Italian investor will earn an after-tax return of (1- TIP)CI if she invests in that
same asset. Because both investors are assumed to invest any available funds not invested in the
alternative asset in the benchmark asset, the value of the alternative asset to the Portuguese
investor, VP, is given by the following expression:
(4)
Similarly, the value of the alternative asset to the Italian investor, VI, is given by the
following expression:
.

1

(5)

This is what Graetz and Warren refer to as proposition 2. See Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1143.
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As before, the alternative asset will be acquired by the party that places the higher value on
that asset. That, in turn, implies the following: 2
,

(6a)

which in turn implies:

1.

(6b)

It follows from equations (6a) and (6b) that what we call “retention ratios,” that is, the ratio
of the share of an investor’s before-tax earnings he would retain after taxes if he invested in the
alternative asset (1-TP) relative to the share of before tax earnings he would receive if he invested
in the benchmark asset (1-TI), can affect who owns what investments. Specifically, in the case
where the alternative asset produces the same amount in both investors’ hands, equations (6a)
and (6b) can be rewritten as:3
(7a)
or

1.

(7b)

If the fraction in equation (7b) is close to 1, then small changes in tax rates will have a
dramatic impact on the ownership of assets. A small change in taxes that causes the fraction in
equation (7b) to shift from less than 1 to more than 1 will shift ownership of the alternative asset
from the Italian investor to the Portuguese investor. Equation (6a) demonstrates how such
changes could have negative welfare consequences by causing society to lose the benefit of the
more productive owner. It is such distortions that are the logic behind CON as a normative
welfare benchmark.
2
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at 1143.
3
This establishes what Graetz and Warren refer to as proposition 3. See Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J.
at 1143.
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Take a look at equations (3) and (6b). The difference between equations (3) and (6b) is that
equation (6b) also contains the fraction that is made up of the 4 retention rates. Note further that
in order to ensure that taxes will not affect ownership, the fraction made up from the various
retention rates must equal 1. If that fraction is not identically 1, then it is possible for taxation to
affect the ownership of assets.

The above tax rates, denoted by T, are total tax rates. They represent the total tax rate paid
on income by an investor from Italy or Portugal investing in either the alternative or benchmark
asset. Those rates are going to be a function of the rates in the two countries and a function of
the tax system. Thus, in order to examine how tax various tax policies will affect ownership,
some additional notation is needed. Denote the tax rate assessed by a single country by t. If the
tax is assessed by the country of residence that country is denoted by a subscript. Thus, a
residence tax assessed by Portugal is denoted by tP whereas a residence tax denoted by Italy is
written tI. A uniform residence tax is one where the same tax is assessed on domestic residents
with domestic income as on domestic residents with foreign income. When necessary, a second
subscript is used to denote the source of the income. Thus, the residence tax rate assessed by
Italy on the domestic income of a Italian resident is written tI,I whereas the residence tax rate
assessed by Italy on the foreign income of a Italian resident is written tI,P. Hence, with uniform
residence taxation, tI = tI,I = tI,P. If the tax is assessed by the source country, then that country is
denoted by a superscript. Hence, the source tax assessed by Portugal is tP and the source tax
assessed by Italy is tI. By analogy to residence taxation, a second superscript is used where
needed to designate the residence of the investor. Thus, the source tax imposed by Portugal on
income earned in Portugal by Portuguese residents is given by tP,P whereas the source tax
imposed by Portugal on income earned in Portugal by Italian residents is given by tP,I.

The total tax rates, T, can be expressed as functions of the source and residence tax rates, t.
For example, if both Italy and Portugal embrace territorial taxation, then TPP = tP,P and TIP = tP,I.
If Portugal has uniform source taxation, tP = tP,P = tP,I, then TPP = TIP = tP. Similarly, if Italy has
uniform source taxation, then TPI = TII = tI.
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Using the above notation, it is possible to express various tax policies.

For example,

territorial taxation (with uniform source tax rates in each jurisdiction) implies in Portugal that
TPP = TIP = tP and in Italy that TPI = TII = tI. Substituting the territorial tax rates in Portugal and
Italy into equation (7b), that equation becomes:

1.

(8)

It is, thus, clear from equation (8) that the fraction on the right side of that equation after “as”
is identically 1. It, thus, follows that uniform source taxation does not compromise CON.

Similarly, residence taxation (with uniform rates regardless of where one earns income) or
worldwide taxation with unlimited foreign tax credits implies for Portuguese residents that TPP =
TPI = tP and for Italian residents that TIP = TII = tI. Substituting the territorial tax rates in Portugal
and Italy into equation (7b), that equation becomes:
1.

(9)

It is, thus, clear from equation (9) that the fraction on the right side of that equation after “as”
is identically 1. It, thus, follows that uniform residence taxation or worldwide taxation with
unlimited foreign tax credits does not compromise CON.

Finally, the total tax rates with ideal deduction can also be written as a function of the source
and residence tax rates. Assuming uniform source and residence taxation,4 then the total rates
are as follows:
1

1

(10a)

1

1

(10b)

1

1

(10c)

1

1

(10d)

4

Uniform residence taxation implies that tI = tI,I = tI,P and that tP = tP,I = tP,P, but it does not require that tI = tP.
Similarly, uniform source taxation implies that tI = tI,I = tI,P and that tP = tP,I = tP,P, but it does not require that tI = tP.
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Substituting the total tax rates in equations (10a) – (10d) into equation (7b), that equation
becomes:

1.

(11)

In equation (8), the two fractions on the right side of that equation after “as” multiply one
another. The first fraction is from equation (9), which is identically 1, and the second fraction is
from equation (8), which is also identically 1. It, thus, follows that the fraction on the right side
of equation (11) is identically 1. From that result it follows that ideal deduction does not
compromise CON.5

Equation (11) was constructed assuming that both Portugal and Italy employ uniform source
and residence taxation. Dropping that assumption, equation (11) can be rewritten as:
,
,
,
,

,
,
,

1.

(12)

,

Although equation (12) is somewhat messy, it can be used along with equation (11) in order
to understand how nonuniform taxation will compromise CON. Focus on the top half of the left
fraction, which describes how Portugal taxes its residents.

If Portugal taxes its residents

uniformly that fraction, (1-tP,P)/(1-tP,I) is identically 1. If it does not, then that fraction is not
identically 1. Such nonuniform taxation will compromise CON unless one of the other tax
systems is nonuniform and that nonuniformity exactly offsets the nonuniformity in Portugal’s
residence tax system. The argument is the same for the bottom half of the fraction on the left,
which describes Italy’s residence tax system.

Moving from residence to source taxation, the right fraction describes the states’ source tax
systems. Recall that with uniform source taxation, the fraction on the top, (1-tP)/(1-tI), equaled
the fraction on the bottom, which was identical to it, and so the right fraction was identically 1.
If, however, one state, deviates from uniform source taxation, then the numerator of the right
5

Apparently, the claim that various tax systems do not violate CON is not part of what Graetz and Warren
describe as the major propositions in our argument. See Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1143-44.
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fraction will not equal the denominator of that fraction. Unless, therefore, there is another
nonuniformity in the tax system that exactly offsets the first nonuniformity, CON will be lost. 6

6

This establishes in more detail than above what Graetz and Warren refer to as proposition 3. See Graetz &
Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1143. This also establishes what Graetz and Warren describe as the conclusion.
See Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1144.
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Appendix II
Françoise and Günther Revisited

In our original article, we provided an arithmetic example designed to illustrate that both
worldwide taxation with unlimited foreign tax credits and ideal deduction preserve competitive
neutrality.1 In addition, we used that example to illustrate how nonuniform taxation will distort
competitive neutrality.2 In their reply, Graetz and Warren observed that although we explicitly
state that our results assume certain market conditions, our example does not clearly incorporate
those conditions.3 Specifically, they note that our assumption that German producers are looking
to produce a fixed output, not hire a fixed number of workers, is not directly incorporated into
our example. 4 Accordingly, this appendix reworks the example of Günther and Françoise from
our original article to explicitly incorporate that assumption. In addition, we have taken this
opportunity to revise the example slightly by changing some of the tax rates in the last example.
We make that change for two reasons. First, we make the change to allow for the possibility that
tax rates will differ across all four quadrants. Second, we make the change to show that even
when tax rates are the same for competitors in a single market, it is still possible for taxation to
distort competition.

Consider two countries France and Germany. Residents of both countries compete for jobs
in both countries. Initially, consider one resident from each country. Françoise resides in France
and Günther resides in Germany, and they both compete for a job in each jurisdiction. 5 Assume
further that Françoise and Günther are equally productive when they work in France, but that
Françoise is substantially more productive than Günther when working in Germany. Putting
some numbers to these assumptions, let us say that Françoise and Günther each would produce
€100 of output in France, that Günther would produce €100 in Germany, but that Françoise
would produce €150 in Germany. Table 1 illustrates this.

1

Mason & Knoll (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1060-68.
Mason & Knoll (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1068-72.
3
Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1144-46.
4
Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1144-46.
5
The jobs are assumed not to require residence changes. Thus, Françoise will continue to reside in France
regardless of the job she takes, and Günther will continue to reside in Germany regardless of the job he takes.
2
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TABLE 1. COMPETITIVE NEUTRALITY IN A NO-TAX WORLD
JOB IN FRANCE
Françoise
Gross Income and Take- €100
Home Pay

Günther
€100

JOB IN GERMANY
Françoise
€150

Günther
€100

Under these circumstances, and assuming that there is only one job in each state, productive
efficiency requires Françoise to work in Germany and Günther to work in France. Françoise
should work in France because the ratio (1½) of her productivity in Germany (€150) to her
productivity in France (€100) exceeds the ratio (1) of Günther’s productivity in Germany (€100)
to his productivity in France (€100). Conversely, Günther should work in France because the
ratio (1) of his productivity in France (€100) to his productivity in Germany (€100) exceeds the
ratio (2/3) of Françoise’s productivity in France (€100) as compared to her productivity in
Germany (€150).

That the market will efficiently match workers to jobs can be seen by assuming that
Françoise and Günther compete for jobs by offering to take less than the full value that they
produce. When considering how much to bid for a job in Germany, both Françoise and Günther
will consider their alternative job opportunities in France. Since Günther earns €100 if he takes a
job in France, which is the full value of his output there, he will not be willing to accept less than
€100 in Germany, which is the full value of his output in Germany. In contrast, because
Françoise is more productive in Germany than in France, she can lower the wage she demands in
Germany (relative to her productivity) and still come out ahead compared to working in France,
where the maximum she can earn is €100 (the full value of her output in France). Specifically,
Françoise will be willing to work for as little as €100 in Germany, even though she produces
€150 there.

In order to describe the nature of the equilibrium more clearly, assume that there are many
Françoises and many Günthers and that employers are not restricted to hiring a fixed number of
employees, but rather are trying to produce a given output at least cost. Those assumptions
imply that employers will select employees with the greatest relative difference between their
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wage and their output. To make this assumption concrete, assume that there are 100 identical
Françoises and 100 identical Günthers each with productivity levels as given in Table 1. In
addition, assume that the demand for workers in France at a wage equal to their productivity
level (€100) is unlimited. In contrast, the demand in Germany for workers is limited. Producers
are willing to pay workers for €9000 of output. Once that level of production is met, the demand
for workers disappears. The above assumptions imply that workers will earn their marginal
product if they work in France, but they have to compete for work in Germany.

Under these assumptions, each Françoise is willing to accept as little as 2/3 of her total
output in Germany as payment for her services for working there. That is to say, each Françoise
is willing to accept as little as €100 to work in Germany because that is what she can earn in
France. That leaves German employers with a €50 surplus from hiring each Francoise. If
German employers hire only Françoises (no Günthers are hired in Germany), then 60 Françoises
will be hired in Germany and their German employers will receive a total surplus of €3000.
Accordingly, 40 Françoises will work in France, where they will earn €100, just as their German
counterparts.

As with each Françoise, each Günther will require €100 to work in Germany because that is
what he can earn in France.6 However, because each Günther produces exactly €100 of output
working in Germany, there is no surplus to the employer from hiring a Günther. As a result, in
the absence of taxation, equilibrium in the market for employees has all Günthers working in
France earning €100, 40 Françoises working in France earning €100, and 60 Françoises working
in Germany earning €100. French employers earn no economic rents; they break even; German
employers earn an economic rent of €50 for each Francoise they hire.

The above equilibrium is a baseline without taxation. We will use that baseline to show that
when all states have the same international tax system, uniform taxes will not distort the
matching of workers and jobs, whereas nonuniform taxes will. We start by introducing
worldwide residence taxes with unlimited credits for foreign taxes. Assume that both France and

6

Thus, if all German employers hired Günthers, they could hire 90 Günthers. That would leave 10 Günthers to
work in France.
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Germany implement worldwide taxation with unlimited foreign tax credits. Assume further that
France taxes at 20% both its residents on their worldwide income and nonresidents (Germans) on
their income earned in France whereas Germany taxes at 50% both its residents and nonresidents
(French) on their German income. The following chart compares how much each worker would
take home after taxes if each earned his or her productivity-determined wage in each state:

TABLE 2. COMPETITIVE NEUTRALITY UNDER WORLDWIDE TAXATION

a
b
c
e

Gross Income
Source Tax
Net Residence Tax/Refund7
Take Home Pay
Total Tax Rate

JOB IN FRANCE
Uniform 20%
worldwide taxation
Françoise Günther
100
100
(20)
(20)
0
(30)
80
50
20%
50%

JOB IN GERMANY
Uniform 50%
worldwide taxation
Françoise Günther
150
100
(75)
(50)
45
0
120
50
20%
50%

As residents of different states that have different tax rates, Françoise and Günther take home
different amounts after payment of all taxes. However, because the ratio of their after-tax wages
relative to each other is unchanged from the world without taxes, taxation has not distorted the
competition between Françoise and Günther for jobs. Even after taxes, Françoise still earns 50%
more when she works in Germany (€120) than when she works in France (€80), whereas
Günther still earns the same amount (€50) no matter where he works. Although Françoise is
taxed at a total tax rate of 20% whereas Günther is taxed at a total tax rate of 50%, the difference
in tax liability does not translate into a change in the ratio of Françoise’s earnings in Germany
relative to her earnings in France; nor does it translate into a change in the ratio of Günther’s
earnings in Germany relative to his earnings in France. (Hence, taxation does not result in a
change in the ratio of these two ratios.) Thus, in order to have a job in Germany rather than in
France, Françoise still would be willing to accept a (before-tax) salary equal to only two-thirds of
what she produces in Germany. In contrast, Günther still would require payment for all he
produces in Germany (or France). Thus, implementation of worldwide taxation with unlimited
foreign tax credits maintains competitive neutrality even in the presence of national tax rate
7

Taxes paid and cash outflows are negative numbers and are in parentheses; refunds and cash inflows are positive
numbers and are not in parentheses. All of our examples assume that the residence state provides unlimited credits
for source taxes.
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diversity. Accordingly, the equilibrium is still characterized by all 100 Günthers working in
France earning €100, 40 Françoises working in France earning €100, and 60 Françoises working
in Germany earning €100. French employers also earn no economic rents; they break even;
German employers earn an economic rent of €50 for each Francoise they hire.

The second way to achieve competitive neutrality is for all states to enact what we call “ideal
deduction” or the “ideal deduction method” of double tax relief, one instantiation of which is
exemption. Under this method, taxes on cross-border income would consist of two stages. The
first stage consists of uniform source taxes. That is, each state applies its source tax regime on
the same basis to both nonresidents and residents who work in its territory. In the second stage,
states tax the worldwide income of their residents, but first stage taxes (i.e., source taxes,
including domestic source taxes) are deductible from income taxable at residence. Thus, under
the ideal deduction method, states tax their own residents on two jurisdictional predicates: source
and residence. Under ideal deduction, states need not adopt the same tax rates as each other; that
is, they need not harmonize their tax rates. However, each state must apply its own taxes
uniformly.

In our original article, we assumed each state assessed its source taxes at the same rate at its
residence taxes.8 That assumption was not necessary for our results. It also had the effect of
equating total tax rates of French residents working in Germany and German residents working
in France.9 Because that assumption is not necessary for our results, we now introduce different
source and residence rates in each jurisdiction. Accordingly, assume that France imposes a 30%
source tax and a 20% residence tax. Also assume that Germany imposes a 40% source tax and a
50% residence tax on equivalent terms. Recall that under ideal deduction, each country applies
its source tax uniformly to all workers, foreign and domestic, that earn income within their
territory.

Because jurisdictions now impose source taxes at different rates, those source taxes will
affect the relative before-tax wages across the two countries. Because German source income is
8

Mason & Knoll (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1065-67 (assuming that France imposes source and residence taxes at
20% and Germany imposes source and residence taxes at 50%).
9
The total tax rate in both circumstances were 60% [=20% + 50% - (20% x 50%)].
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taxed at 40%, whereas French-source income is taxed at only 30%, if jobs paid the same in
Germany and France, both German and French residents would take home less if they worked in
Germany than if they worked in France. Accordingly, in equilibrium, jobs in Germany will pay
more than equivalent jobs in France so that, regardless of their residence, workers will earn the
same amount after payment of source taxes. For example, in equilibrium, if a French job pays
€100, then the equivalent job in Germany will pay €116.67,10 and the after-source-tax wage in
each jurisdiction will be the same, namely €70.

For this example, we maintain our assumption that Françoise and Günther are equally
productive when they work in France, and we assume that they would both earn €100 (before
tax) for work there. However, since in equilibrium wages are 16.67% higher in Germany than in
France in order to compensate for higher German source taxes, both Françoise and Günther will
earn more in Germany than in France.11 Since we continue to assume for this example that
Françoise is 50% more productive than Günther when they both work in Germany, Günther will
earn €116.67 if he works in Germany and Françoise will earn €175 if she works in Germany.
The following chart shows that competitive neutrality is maintained if both states implement
ideal deduction, which requires residence states to allow deductions for source state taxes
(including their own source taxes),:12

10

Given the salary in France (€100), the salary in Germany is calculated as follows: €116.67 = €100 x (1-30%) /
(1-40%).
11
The higher German taxes will drive jobs to France. Only those positions in which workers are productive
enough to cover the additional German source taxes will remain in Germany.
12
The simplest version of ideal deduction is an exemption system. If the example in the text were changed so that
France and Germany employed exemption, the tax rate in the second stage would be zero, which effectively
eliminates the second stage. The taxpayers’ take home pay would be as follows:
TABLE A. COMPETITIVE NEUTRALITY UNDER EXEMPTION

a.
b.
c.

Gross Income
Source Tax
Residence Tax

e.

Take Home Pay

JOB IN FRANCE
Uniform 30% source
tax, no residence tax

JOB IN GERMANY
Uniform 40% source
tax, no residence tax

Françoise

Françoise

Günther

100
(30)
N/A

Günther

100
(30)
N/A

175
(70)
N/A

116.67
(46.67)
N/A

70

70

105

70

When all the states employ exemption, no worker has a tax-induced advantage or disadvantage compared to any
other for work in any particular jurisdiction. Thus, exemption maintains competitive neutrality.
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TABLE 3. COMPETITIVE NEUTRALITY UNDER IDEAL DEDUCTION
JOB IN FRANCE
Uniform 30% source
and 20% residence
taxes
Françoise Günther

JOB IN GERMANY
Uniform 40% source
and 50% residence taxes
Françoise

Günther

100

100

175

116.67

b. Source Tax

(30)

(30)

(70)

(46.67)

c.

70

70

105

70

d. Residence Tax13

(14)

(35)

(21)

(35)

e.

Take Home Pay

56

35

84

35

Total Tax Rate

44%

65%

52%

70%

a.

Gross Income

Residence Income

As in the example with worldwide taxation, Françoise and Günther earn different after-all-tax
wages and pay taxes at different total rates. Even so, taxation will not affect the matching of
workers with jobs. Assuming that there is still unlimited demand for workers in France and that
the demand for workers in Germany is still for a fixed output, say now €7000 to reflect the
higher relative cost of production in Germany, all of the Günthers will continue to work in
France, and Françoises (now 40) will fulfill the demand for workers in Germany. As in the prior
examples, no Günther is willing to accept less than the full value of what he produces in order to
take a job in Germany, whereas each Françoise is still willing to take a one-third discount to
work in Germany. Thus, as with worldwide taxation, implementation of the ideal deduction
method maintains competitive neutrality even in the presence of national tax rate diversity.

It is worth drawing attention to the total tax rates in Table 3. Françoise’s total tax rate in
France is 44%, whereas Gunther’s is 65%. In Germany, Francoise’s total tax rate is 52%,
whereas Gunther’s is 75%. In spite of these different and widely ranging tax rates, taxation has
not affected comparative advantage and so it has not altered competitive neutrality. Expressed in
terms of retention rates, the tax system has not affected the matching of workers and jobs

13

Under ideal deduction, workers are subject to tax on their worldwide income at their residence state’s rate, but
source taxes (including domestic source taxes) are deductible from taxable income.
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because it has not changed relative retention rates.14 Françoise’s retention rate in Germany
(48%) is 6/7ths of her retention rate in France (56%). Similarly, Gunther’s retention rate in
Germany (30%) is 6/7ths of his retention rate in France (35%). Thus, taxation has not affected
the ratio of Françoise’s after-tax earnings in France relative to her after-tax earnings in Germany
as compared to Günther’s after-tax earnings in France relative to his after-tax earnings in
Germany.

Although uniform taxation will achieve competitive neutrality when all states adopt the same
method for taxing cross-border income (i.e., all states enact worldwide taxation or all states enact
ideal deduction), universal adoption of the same method without uniform taxation will not
achieve competitive neutrality. For example, assume that both France and Germany still
implement ideal deduction and that France assesses uniform source and residence taxes.
Assume, however, Germany assesses non-uniform source taxes – perhaps to encourage German
employers to hire German workers. Specifically, Germany continues to tax the German income
of French residents at 40% whereas it taxes the German income of German residents at only 5%.

i.

Table 4. Nonuniform Source Taxation Violates Competitive

Neutrality Under the Ideal Deduction Method

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

Gross Income
Source Tax
Residence Income
Residence Tax
Take Home Pay
Total Tax Rate

JOB IN FRANCE
Uniform 30% source
and 20% residence
taxes
Françoise Günther
100
100
(30)
(30)
70
70
(14)
(35)
56
35
44%
65%

JOB IN GERMANY
Uniform 50% residence
tax, nonuniform (5%,
40%) source tax
Françoise Günther
175
116.67
(70)
(5.83)
105
110.83
(21)
(55.42)
84
55.42
52%
53%

As Table 4 illustrates, although Françoise earns more after all taxes than does Günther regardless
of where they work, Günther now has an advantage in the competition to secure a job in
Germany. As in the prior examples, Françoise is willing to accept as little as 67% (i.e., €56/€84)
of her productivity-determined wage in Germany to secure a job in Germany rather than a job in
14

Retention rates and ratios are described in Appendix I, supra.
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France at which she would be less productive. However, because Günther faces a much lower
source tax when he works in Germany than when he works in France, Günther is willing to
accept as little as 63% (i.e., €35/€55.42) of his productivity-determined wage in Germany in
order to secure the job in Germany rather than the job in France that would subject him to high
German source taxation. Because employers will hire the worker with the largest relative
difference between productivity and wage, employers in Germany now will prefer to hire
Günthers, who demand in wages only 63% of what they produce (€73.68) than to hire
Françoises, who demand 67% of what they produce (€116.67). Accordingly, if employers in
Germany are still looking to produce €7000 of output, they will hire 60 Günthers. They will pay
these Günthers €4420.80 in total, which will leave them a profit of €2579.20. That is €246 more
than they would earn if they hired 40 Françoises at €116.67 (for a total cost of €4666.80) to
produce the same output. The remaining 40 Günthers will be employed in France where they
will be joined by all 100 Francoises.

It is easy to show that the resulting allocation of workers to jobs is inefficient. If German
employers hired Françoises instead of Günthers, they would need to hire only 40 Françoises to
produce what the 60 Günthers produce. That would free 60 Günthers to work in France.
However, it would take only 40 of those Günthers working in France to produce what the 40
Françoises produced when they were working in France. The output of the additional 20
Günthers working in France is therefore surplus and hence proof of the inefficient allocation
brought about by nonuniform taxation.

Moreover, it should be pointed out that Günther has a tax-induced competitive advantage
over Françoise to land a job in Germany in spite of paying tax at a slightly higher total tax rate
(53%) than Françoise (52%) when working in Germany. That result can be expressed in terms
of retention rates and retention ratios. Günther’s retention rate if he works in France is 35% and
his retention rate if he works in Germany is 47%.15 Accordingly, his retention ratio for working
in Germany relative to working France is 115.8%,16 and his retention ratio for working in France
15

A retention rate is one minus a taxpayer’s total tax rate. Accordingly, Günther’s retention rate if he works in
France is 35% because his total tax rate if he works in France is 65%. Similarly, Günther’s retention rate if he
works in Germany is 47% because his total tax rate if he works in Germany is 53%.
16
This is calculated as 115.8% = 47% ÷ 35%.
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relative to Germany is 86.3%.17 Similarly, Françoise’s retention rate in France is 56% and her
retention rate in Germany is 48%.18 Accordingly, her retention ratio in Germany relative to
France is 85.7% and her retention ratio in France relative to Germany is 116.7%.19

Thus,

Günther has a tax-induced competitive advantage over Françoise in Germany as compared to
France because his retention ratio (115.8%) is higher than her retention ratio (85.7%).
Conversely, Françoise has a tax-induced comparative advantage over Günther to land a job in
France as compared to Germany because Françoise’s retention ratio in France as compared to
Germany (116.7%) is higher than Günther’s retention ratio (86.4%). As the above example
illustrates, Germany’s nonuniform source tax has reversed Françoise’s comparative advantage
over Günther in Germany. Françoise derived her original comparative advantage over Günther
in Germany from her greater productivity in Germany, However, Germany’s lower tax rate on
the German income of Germans as compared to the German income of non-Germans more than
offset the productivity advantage of non-Germans.

Alternatively, Germany might try to dissuade Germans from working abroad by taxing
Germans at a higher rate on their foreign income than their domestic income. Assume that
Germany assesses uniform source taxation at 40%, but that Germany assesses non-uniform
residence taxation. Specifically, assume Germany taxes the foreign income of German residents
at 50%, but that it imposes a residence tax on the German income of German residents of only
20%. The following chart shows the income, taxes, and take-home pay of Françoises and
Günthers.

17

This is calculated as 86.3% = 35 ÷ 47%.
Françoise’s retention rate if she works in France is 56% because her total tax rate if she works in France is 44%.
Similarly, Françoise’s retention rate if she works in Germany is 48% because her total tax rate if she works in
Germany is 52%.
19
Françoise’s retention ratio in Germany relative to France is calculated as 85.7% = 48 ÷ 56%, and her retention
ratio in France relative to Germany is calculated as 116.7% = 56% ÷ 48%.
18
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ii.

Table 5. Nonuniform Residence Taxation Violates Competitive

Neutrality Under the Ideal Deduction Method

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

Gross Income
Source Tax
Residence Income
Residence Tax
Take Home Pay
Total Tax Rate

JOB IN FRANCE
Uniform 30% source
and 20% residence
taxes
Françoise Günther
100
100
(30)
(30)
70
70
(14)
(35)
56
35
44%
65%

JOB IN GERMANY
Uniform 40% source
tax, nonuniform (20%,
50%) residence tax
Françoise Günther
175
116.67
(70)
(46.67)
105
70
(21)
(14)
84
56
52%
52%

As in the prior example, nonuniform taxation (now nonuniform residence taxation) has
provided the Günthers with a tax-induced comparative advantage in the competition to secure a
job in Germany. As in the prior examples, Françoise is willing to accept as little as 67% (i.e.,
€56/€84) of her productivity-determined wage in Germany to secure a job in Germany rather
than a job in France at which she would be less productive. However, because Günther faces a
much lower residence tax when he works in Germany than when he works in France, Günther is
willing to accept as little as 63% (i.e., €35/€56) of his productivity-determined wage in Germany
in order to secure the job in Germany rather than the job in France that would subject him to high
German residence taxation. The equilibrium is the same as above – and is just as inefficient. As
this example makes clear, it is not enough to maintain uniform source taxation (and agreement
on a method of taxing international income) to achieve competitive neutrality. In addition,
residence taxes must also be uniform.
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Appendix III
Imputation Credits

In this Appendix, we demonstrate that corporate integration accomplished by granting
shareholders imputation credits for taxes paid by their corporations will not compromise
competitive neutrality if those imputation credits are granted on a uniform source or uniform
residence basis. However, before demonstrating that imputation credits are consistent with
competitive neutrality, we first demonstrate that the classical corporate income tax is consistent
with competitive neutrality. Both demonstrations are made through a simple example.

Consider Danish investors in a Danish company that earns only Danish-source income.
Assume Danish corporations earn an annual before-tax return of 10% and that Danish
corporations distribute all their after-tax earnings. Assume further that Denmark imposes a flat
40% corporate tax and a flat 50% personal tax and that Denmark has a classical corporate tax
system. Thus, a €1000 investment by a Dane in a Danish company will return €100 after one
year. That €100 income will attract €40 corporate tax. The Danish investor will report €60 of
personal income and will incur a personal tax liability of €30. That liability will leave the
Danish investor with €30. Thus, Danish residents earn 3% annually after-tax on investments in
Danish companies, and Danish companies can raise capital from Danish investors at 10%, which
is also the hurdle rate for new investment by Danish companies.

Now consider, Poland, which we assume also has a classical corporate income tax system.
Assume Poland imposes a flat 25% corporate tax and a flat 30% personal tax. Corporate
investments in Poland earn 8% annually before tax, and Polish corporations also fully distribute
their after-tax earnings.1 Thus, a €1000 investment in Poland will generate €80, which will
attract €20 tax, leaving the investor with €60. A Pole who invests €1000 in a Polish company
will earn €60 a year after paying Polish corporate tax and pay €18 in individual tax. That will
leave the Polish investor with €42. Similarly, a Polish investor who invests €1000 in a Danish
company will receive a dividend of €60, pay €18 in individual tax, and be left with €42. Thus, a

1

The lower before-tax return in Poland is a result of a lower source tax rate in Poland than in Denmark. The
lower source tax rate in Poland will attract capital to Poland thereby violating locational neutrality.
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Polish investor would be indifferent between the two investments. Similarly, a Danish investor
would be indifferent between investing in the shares of Polish and Danish companies. Either
way, the Dane receives €60 each year after corporate tax, pays €30 of individual tax, and so is
left with €30. Thus, the classic corporate income tax (with uniform source and residence taxes)
will not compromise competitive neutrality.2

Assume now that Denmark grants imputation credits that credit resident investors fully for
the taxes paid by Danish corporations on Danish-source income. Assuming that the before-tax
return on Danish investments does not change, so that a €1000 investment in such a company
will still return €100 after one year, the investment will still incur €40 corporate tax. However,
in contrast with the classical corporate income tax, the Danish investor will report €100 income
(comprised of €60 cash dividend and €40 corporate tax paid on that dividend) and will incur a
tentative tax liability of €50. That liability will be reduced by the €40 credit, resulting in an
additional liability of €10, and leaving the Danish investor with €50 after the payment of all
taxes. Thus, Danish residents earn 5% after-tax on investments in Danish companies and Danish
companies can still raise capital from Danish investors at 10%.

Assume further that the credit is implemented by both Denmark and Poland and that the
credit is granted on a uniform residence basis inasmuch as each state fully credits both foreign
and domestic corporate taxes that are indirectly paid by its residents. That is to say, Denmark
grants Danish residents imputation credits for corporate taxes paid by both Danish and Polish
corporations, and Poland grants Polish residents imputation credits for corporate taxes paid by
both Danish and Polish corporations. .

In such circumstances, shareholders’ tax liabilities

depend only upon their residence tax rates, not at all on the corporate tax rates. Accordingly,
because differences in the corporation state’s tax rates will not affect investors’ total tax
2

The above result can be expressed using retention rates and ratios, as described in Appendix I. Danish
investors pay a total tax rate of 70% on corporate investments in Denmark and of 62.5% on corporate investments in
Poland. Thus, Danish investors’ retention rates are 30% for investments in Danish corporations and 37.5% for
investments in Polish corporations. Thus, Danish investors have a retention ratio of 80% for investments in Danish
as compared to Polish corporations. Polish investors pay a total tax rate of 58% on corporate investments in
Denmark and of 47.5% on corporate investments in Poland. Thus, Polish investors’ retention rates are 42% for
investments in Danish corporations and 52.5% for investments in Polish corporations. Thus, Polish investors have a
retention ratio of 80% for investments in Danish as compared to Polish corporations. Therefore, because the
retention ratios are the same (80%), the classical corporate income tax with uniform taxes does not distort
ownership.
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liabilities, taxes will not distort the location of capital. Thus, in the simple example employed
here, pre-tax returns will be equal across states. Assume, then, that a €1000 investment in a
Danish or Polish corporation produces an annual pre-tax return of €100. After paying all taxes,
Danish investors will earn €50 on investments in both Danish and Polish corporations whereas
Polish investors will earn €70 on such investments. Although Danes are taxed more heavily than
are Poles, taxes will not distort ownership.3

Assume now that Denmark and Poland grant imputation credits on a uniform source basis.
As applied to Denmark, for example, Denmark will refund to Polish shareholders of Danish
corporations the taxes paid by Danish corporations on behalf of Polish shareholders. Under such
circumstances, source taxes will not impact investors.

Effectively, domestic and foreign

investors will pay tax on their equity investments in both domestic and foreign corporations at
the investors’ individual residence tax rate.4 Thus, as in the prior example, after paying taxes,
Danish investors will earn €50 on investments in both Danish and Polish corporations whereas
Polish investors will earn €70 on such investments. And as in the prior example, although Danes
are taxed more heavily than are Poles, taxes will not distort location or ownership.

In contrast, if Denmark and Poland were to adopt non-uniform versions of shareholder
imputation, then ownership would be distorted. Assume that Denmark and Poland both choose
to grant imputation credits to residents only and only for equity investments in domestic
corporations. Thus, Denmark will grant imputation credits only to Danish investors in Danish
corporations and Poland will grant imputation credits only to Polish investors in Polish
companies. Accordingly, Denmark will not grant imputation credits to Danish investors in
Polish companies or to Polish investors in Danish companies, nor will Poland grant imputation
credits to Polish investors in Danish companies or to Danish investors in Polish companies. To

3

The above result can also be expressed using retention rates and ratios. The retention rate for Danes is 50%
for equity investments in both Denmark and Poland and the retention rate for Poles is 70% for equity investments in
both Denmark and Poland. Accordingly, the retention ratios for Danes and Poles are both 1 and so ownership is not
distorted by taxes.
4
The difference between this and the prior example is that in the prior example (credit extended to
shareholdings in foreign companies) the corporations’ state receives and retains the corporate tax revenue when
foreign investors hold shares in domestic corporations. In contrast, in the current example (credit extended to
shareholdings by foreign investors in domestic companies) the corporations’ state does not retain corporate tax
revenue when foreign investors hold shares in domestic corporations.
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keep the calculations simple, assume that rates of return are unchanged with all corporations
earning 10 percent before taxes. Danish investors would pay a total tax of 50% on investments
in Danish corporations and a total tax of 62.5% on investments in Polish corporations. In
contrast, Polish investors would pay 40% total tax on investments in Polish corporations and
58% total tax on investments in Danish corporations. Because Danish and Polish investors are
both taxed more heavily on investments in foreign corporations, the tax system distorts
ownership by encouraging both groups of investors to invest in domestic rather than foreign
corporations. 5

The discussion above looked at only a few limited examples with imputation credits. We
intend to examine corporate integration in more detail in future work.

5

The above result can also be expressed using retention rates and ratios. Danish investors pay a total tax rate of
50% on corporate investments in Denmark and of 62.5% on corporate investments in Poland. Thus, Danish
investors’ retention rates are 50% for investments in Danish corporations and 37.5% for investments in Polish
corporations. Thus, Danish investors have a retention ratio of 133% for investments in Danish as compared to
Polish corporations. Polish investors pay a total tax rate of 58% on corporate investments in Denmark and of 40%
on corporate investments in Poland. Thus, Polish investors’ retention rates are 42% for investments in Danish
corporations and 60% for investments in Polish corporations. Thus, Polish investors have a retention ratio of 70%
for investments in Danish as compared to Polish corporations. Accordingly, because Danes (133%) have a higher
retention ratio than Poles (70%) for equity investments in Danish as compared to Polish corporations, the tax system
distorts ownership by encouraging Danes to invest in Danish corporations and discouraging Poles from doing so.
The retention ratios are the inverse for investments in Poland as compared with Denmark. Thus, Danish investors
have a retention ratio of 75% for equity investments in Poland as compared to Denmark, whereas Polish investors
have a retention ratio of 143% for such investments. Accordingly, because Poles (143%) have a higher retention
ratio than Danes (75%) for equity investments in Polish as compared to Danish corporations, the tax system distorts
ownership by encouraging Poles to invest in Polish corporations and discouraging Danes from doing so. It,
therefore, follows that non-uniform imputation credits will distort ownership compromising competitive neutrality.
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